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Abstract 
A hallmark of adult language processing is the efficiency with which it unfolds despite 
the massive amount of ambiguity present in the linguistic signal. Prior work has shown that 
visuo-spatial (e.g., Heller et al., 2008; Ryskin et al., 2014) and pragmatic (Sedivy et al., 1999) 
contextual information can be rapidly integrated during the comprehension process. In this 
dissertation, I explored the use of this information during on-line language processing and how it 
is supported by learning and memory mechanisms. In Chapter 2, I examined whether individual 
differences in working memory, basic recall, and memory cue generation predict the ability to 
make use of information about visual perspective differences during comprehension. A targeted 
re-analysis of these data (Experiment 2), examined how perspective-taking evolves within a 
conversational pair, over the course of the conversation. In Chapter 3, I explored the use of 
spatial perspective-taking during comprehension. In two experiments (Experiments 3 and 4), I 
examine how listeners encode spatial perspectives in a speaker-specific fashion and use this 
information during interpretation of spatial language. In Chapter 4, I examined whether listeners 
can learn high-level, pragmatic information about a speaker through exposure and integrate it 
with the visual context on-line, during sentence processing. I examined the ability of listeners to 
learn and transfer this information across contexts (Experiments 5a and 5b), as well as the ability 
to use this information within a context (Experiment 6). The results of the work reported in this 
dissertation point to an important role for context-specific learning in the ability of the language 
processing system to rapidly and efficiently integrate visual, spatial, and pragmatic information 
during on-line comprehension.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Despite the incredible complexity and variability intrinsic to language, in everyday life 
we are able to comprehend and produce language without giving a second thought to the many 
cognitive processes recruited for those purposes. For example, to understand and respond to your 
colleague’s simple question, “What did you think of that talk?,” your language system will bring 
to bear visual input (e.g., to identify the speaker), search long-term memory (e.g., to recall what 
talks you have been to recently), and draw pragmatic inferences (e.g., to assume your colleague 
is referring to a talk she also attended but has not yet discussed with you), among many other 
sources of information.  
This extra-linguistic information is critical to our ability to communicate efficiently in 
daily life. By integrating information from all available, relevant sources (e.g., who the speaker 
is, where they are located, what has been said in the past), the listener discovers constraints on 
the meaning of a sentence as it unfolds and narrows down the set of candidate referents. 
Predicting features of upcoming language input, allows for a more rapid and fluid 
comprehension process (see Kuperberg & Jaeger, 2016 for a review) where interlocutors rarely 
fail to converge on the same interpretation of a sentence despite under-specification in the 
linguistic signal. The nature and scope of this extra-linguistic information, as well as the memory 
mechanisms that support its integration, are not well understood. I have explored these issues in 
three related lines of research. 
 
Individual Differences in Memory and Visual Perspective-taking 
Many activities of everyday life require individuals to imagine a world that differs from 
the one they currently inhabit—whether it’s finding common ground with someone who has had 
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different life experiences or predicting what you will remember in the future. A common setting 
that requires taking a different perspective into account is face-to-face conversation. When two 
individuals converse, some of what they might want to discuss is known to both parties and some 
is known only to one of them. Partners in a dialogue must model each others’ knowledge states 
in order to communicate efficiently (Clark, 1992; 1996; Stalnaker, 1978).  
Similarly, when writing a reminder note for oneself to do something at a later time, such 
as to call a friend to ask for their new home address after they’ve moved, some notes will be 
more effective than others. For example, when you read a note that says “Call Rob” you might 
wonder what it is you were supposed to call him about. On the other hand, “Call Rob about 
address” may provide the appropriate cue to bring to mind all the relevant details of what action 
needs to be taken. When writing a reminder note for yourself, it is necessary to accurately assess 
aspects of your future state at the time of retrieval (Tullis & Benjamin, 2015a, 2015b). This 
assessment is analogous to perspective-taking of your future self—you must determine what will 
be common between your current self and your future self and what is privileged information in 
your current state.  
Perspective-taking in Language Comprehension 
 One set of relevant evidence comes from the visual world eye-tracking paradigm 
(Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995) in which participants’ eye gaze is 
monitored as they observe scenes with real-world objects or images while listening to auditory 
stimuli.  This research suggests that listeners represent information about the perspective of the 
speaker, and use this information to guide processing of the speaker’s utterances (Brown-
Schmidt, Gunlogson, & Tanenhaus, 2008; Ferguson & Breheny, 2012; Hanna, Tanenhaus, & 
Trueswell, 2003; Heller, Grodner, & Tanenhaus, 2008). For example, Heller et al. (2008) asked a 
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speaker (the experimenter) and listener (the participant) to sit on either side of a physical display 
with cubbyholes containing objects (see Figure 1). Most of these objects were mutually visible 
from either side of the display and therefore common ground. In critical conditions, one object 
was placed in a cubbyhole that was occluded from the speaker’s view—that object was in the 
listener’s privileged ground. Eye-movement data indicated that listeners took into account the 
privileged status of that object when interpreting the speaker’s instructions and did not consider 
it to be a potential referent. In other words, listeners inferred that the speaker could not be 
referring to the occluded object even when the speaker’s utterance was potentially consistent 
with it. In order to do this, listeners must form a representation of the speaker’s perspective on 
the visual display and access this perspective information when interpreting the speaker’s 
instructions. 
 
Figure 1. Example stimuli (in four conditions) from Heller et al. (2008), as seen by the listener. 
Items with a white background are visible to a speaker seated on the other side of the cubbyhole 
display. Items with a grey background are hidden from the speaker’s view. When interpreting an 
instruction such as “Click on the big duck.” listeners make more fixations, during “big”, to the 
target (big duck) in the 2 contrasts - privileged condition, compared to 2 contrasts – shared. 
Listeners infer that “big” cannot be referring to the cup in the 2 contrasts - privileged condition 
because the speaker doesn’t see the small cup.  
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Perspective-taking in Language Production 
 When choosing what to say to another person, speakers take into account what the 
addressee does and does not know. At the most basic level, Spanish-English bilingual children 
know from an early age to speak in English to English speakers and Spanish to Spanish speakers 
(Genesee, Nicoladis, & Paradis, 1995). At a more fine-grained level, speakers modulate their use 
of adjectives based on the listener’s knowledge (Nadig & Sedivy, 2002; Matthews, Lieven, 
Theakston, & Tomasello, 2006; Yoon, Koh, & Brown-Schmidt, 2012; Yoon & Brown-Schmidt, 
2014). For example, Nadig and Sedivy (2002) examined a situation in which participants had to 
instruct a listener (the experimenter) about which object in a cubbyhole display to pick up (e.g., 
“Pick up the cup”). The target object was sometimes in a size-contrasted pair (i.e., there was a 
big cup and small cup in the display). When both members of the pair were common ground, 
adult participants, and even 5 and 6-year-olds, always used an adjective (e.g., “Pick up the big 
cup”) to make clear which cup they were referring to. When one of the pair members was 
occluded from the listener’s view (e.g., the small cup was in the speaker’s privileged ground), 
such that there was only one cup visible from the listener’s perspective, participants used the size 
adjective only half of the time. These different choices reflect the fact that the speaker has a 
mental representation of what information the listener has available and that the speaker uses that 
information to guide what she says. 
Perspective-taking in Memory Cue Generation 
Individuals often prospectively generate cues for themselves. For example, students take 
notes in a class in order to be able to recall the class material at a later time. Recall is more likely 
to occur when the retrieval context and the encoding context are more similar (Tulving & 
Thomson, 1973). Thus, creating a successful cue requires predicting the future cognitive context 
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at the time of retrieval—in other words, taking the perspective of one’s future self. Similarly, 
memory retrieval spurred by a previously generated cue and perspective-taking in 
comprehension both require taking the generator’s (yourself in the past or another person) point 
of view into account in order to interpret the received cue. 
Evidence that cue generators do take the perspective of their future selves comes from 
Tullis and Benjamin (2015b), who asked participants to generate either one-word descriptions of 
target words or one-word cues that would support later cued recall of targets. Generated cues 
elicited higher recall than generated descriptions, suggesting that learners tailor their mnemonic 
cues to their future cognitive state.  Learners were even able to hedge against future interference 
among to-be-remembered synonyms by trading off cue-target associative strength for cue 
distinctiveness when necessary. Further, in much the same way as in speech production, learners 
tailor mnemonic cues for different intended recipients; cues are more idiosyncratic when 
generated for themselves than for others (Tullis & Benjamin, 2015a).  
Individual Differences in Perspective-taking 
Despite how widespread perspective-taking seems to be in everyday life, it is not 
something that individuals do effortlessly (Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003; Birch & Bloom, 2007; cf. 
Ryskin & Brown-Schmidt, 2014). Children under the age of four often fail to appreciate that 
other people may hold different beliefs (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) when probed in an explicit 
verbal task. On the other hand, implicit measures show that 15-month-olds are more surprised 
when an agent looks for a toy in the correct location if the agent has never seen the toy be placed 
in that specific location (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). The latter result suggests that children 
may form representations of others’ perspectives very early, but lack the cognitive resources to 
select verbal answers that reflect this knowledge until much later in development. These findings 
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are consistent with evidence that the development of theory of mind in children goes hand in 
hand with the development of inhibitory control (Carlson & Moses, 2001). More specifically, 
children with better executive function are more likely to take into account the perspective of a 
conversation partner when speaking or listening (Nilsen & Graham, 2009). 
Similar relationships between executive function and perspective-taking during language 
comprehension and production have been reported in adults as well. Listeners with superior 
executive control and working memory are more adept at using the speaker’s perspective to 
anticipate the correct referent of a sentence (Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010). 
Speakers are more likely to tailor their utterances appropriately given a listener’s viewpoint 
when they have higher working memory (Wardlow, 2013). It is worth noting however, that these 
effects appear to be very small and do not consistently replicate (Brown-Schmidt, 2012; Ryskin, 
Brown-Schmidt, Canseco-Gonzalez, Nguyen, & Yiu, 2014; Brown-Schmidt & Fraundorf, 2015).  
Executive function also plays a role in a variety of memory tasks that require prospection. 
Individuals with high working memory capacity and superior executive control are more likely 
to remember to carry out an intended action at a specified point in the future (Marsh & Hicks, 
1998; Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2002; Brewer, Knight, Marsh, & Unsworth, 2010; 
Unsworth, Brewer, & Spillers, 2012). They are also more likely to adopt retrieval cues that allow 
for an organized, efficient approach to recalling a list of heterogeneous items (Fiechter, 
Benjamin, & Unsworth, in press; Unsworth & Spillers, 2010, Unsworth, Brewer, & Spillers, 
2013; Unsworth & Engle, 2007). Further, executive and working memory processes have been 
linked to the specificity and richness of representations during future simulation (D’Argembeau, 
Ortoleva, Jumentier, & Van der Linden, 2010; Hill & Emery, 2013).   
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In Chapter 2, I will examine how individual differences in memory (working memory, 
prospective memory, cued recall), perspective-taking during production, and executive function 
relate to listeners’ ability to make joint use of the visual context and perspective information. 
Uncovering these relationships will shed light on the types of cognitive processes brought to bear 
during comprehension when perspective-taking is required. Furthermore, I will examine how 
these individual differences in perspective-taking ability interact at the level of the 
conversational dyad. In a dialogue, partners may differ in their ability to produce effective 
descriptions of referents. An open question is whether an efficient listener can learn to adjust 
when the speaker fails at perspective-taking and how such a process of adjustment might unfold 
over time.  
 
Speaker-Specific Spatial Perspective-taking 
In order to understand a speaker, listeners must consider the speaker’s perspective (Clark, 
H. H., 1992) and how it may differ from their own. Indeed, listeners are sensitive to differences 
in perspectives between themselves and an interlocutor and bring this information to bear in the 
early moments of processing a sentence (Nadig & Sedivy, 2002; Hanna, Tanenhaus, & 
Trueswell, 2003; Heller, Grodner, & Tanenhaus, 2008; Brown-Schmidt, Gunlogson, & 
Tanenhaus, 2008; Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Brown-Schmidt, 2012). The bulk of this evidence 
comes from paradigms in which a difference in perspectives between the speaker and listener is 
created by occluding an item from the speaker’s view (see Figure 1). Much of this research, 
including results from Chapter 2, shows that listeners (at least partially) discount occluded 
objects as potential referents, on the assumption that the speaker is unlikely to speak about 
something they have no knowledge of. This successful use of perspective corresponds to what 
has been referred to as Level 1 knowledge—mental simulation that involves distinguishing what 
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is visible to oneself from what is visible to others, as in occlusion situations. Level 1 knowledge 
emerges early in development and is thought to require little cognitive effort, even by age three 
(Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981; Masangkay, McCluskey, McIntyre, Sims-Knight, 
Vaughn, & Flavell, 1974).   
Differences in perspective can arise from situations other than occlusion, as well. In 
particular, differing spatial viewpoints require interlocutors to take this into account in order to 
understand each other (Schober, 1993). It has been argued that this Level 2 knowledge—the 
ability to appreciate not only that another person sees something, but how they see it—emerges 
later in development and is more cognitively effortful than Level 1 knowledge (Flavell, Everett, 
Croft, & Flavell, 1981; Salatas & Flavell, 1976; Apperly & Butterfill, 2009).  
In daily life, the spatial viewpoints of conversation partners are often misaligned. In fact, 
in some sense, they are never truly aligned because interlocutors can never inhabit the exact 
same location at the same time (Schober, 2009). Speakers frequently and spontaneously take into 
account such differences in perspectives when communicating (Tversky & Hard, 2009). For 
instance, when giving walking directions to a friend, you might say, “From Sixth Street you’ll 
take a left on Daniel Street, and I’ll be standing halfway up the block.” From your own 
perspective, your location is actually to the right of Sixth Street but, as a courtesy to your friend 
who is unfamiliar with the area, you take their perspective in order to avoid confusion. Indeed, 
Schober (2009) found that when participants with high spatial perspective-taking ability are 
matched with participants with low abilities, they adopt spatial language consistent with that 
partner’s perspective more often when giving directions compared to when they are paired with 
someone who is equally capable at spatial perspective-taking. Similarly, speakers use their 
egocentric perspective less when directing a person who is unable to provide immediate 
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feedback about whether they understood the spatial instruction (Schober, 1993). The fact that 
speakers often choose to start with their own perspective when they know that any confusion can 
be easily resolved (i.e., when the person receiving the instructions can ask for clarification) 
points to the inherent difficulties of performing a spatial perspective transformation. 
Spatial Perspective-taking and Memory 
Studies of memory for spatial layouts of objects indicate that a mental change in 
viewpoint renders information about object-to-object relations more difficult to retrieve 
compared to when the viewpoint remains stable (e.g., Shelton & McNamara, 1997; Shelton & 
McNamara, 2001; Simons & Wang, 1998). Rieser (1989) asked participants to memorize an 
array of objects and then tested their ability to retrieve the relative spatial location of an object 
from a novel point of view. Participants had more difficulty doing so when the novel location 
was reached by a rotation (e.g., turning 90°) than by a simple translation (e.g., taking three steps 
forward). One potential explanation for this processing cost associated with viewpoint rotation 
comes from evidence that participants most often encode the environment, and objects within it, 
using an egocentric reference frame (e.g., Wang, 2007; Wang, 2012). As a result, taking another 
perspective requires the effortful transformation of the original (egocentric) reference frame to fit 
a new orientation (Easton & Sholl, 1995; Mou, McNamara, Valiquette, & Rump, 2004; Kessler 
& Thomson, 2010). Others have argued that the processing cost results primarily from the 
sensorimotor interference created between the coordinates in the person’s own perspective and 
those in the imagined perspective (May, 2004; Brockmole & Wang, 2003; Wang, 2005).  
Furthermore, the difficulty of spatial perspective-taking increases with the angular 
disparity between the participant’s viewpoint and the novel viewpoint presented at test (e.g., 
Rieser, 1989; Kessler & Thomson, 2010; Kessler & Rutherford, 2010; Surtees, Apperly, & 
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Samson, 2013; Huttenlocher & Presson, 1973; Levine, Jankovic, & Palij, 1982). The detrimental 
effects of greater angular disparity suggest that spatial perspective-taking is an embodied 
cognitive process (Kessler & Thomson, 2010). Thus, a listener taking into account the 
perspective of her conversation partner will mentally rotate her egocentric perspective to align it 
with the partner’s. 
One way to reduce the cognitive burden of spatial perspective-taking is by providing 
advance information about a viewpoint. Studies asking participants to imagine a perspective 
before seeing an array from the new viewpoint show that the representation of a perspective can 
be maintained in memory in the absence of the visual array that it applies to (Avraamides, 
Ioannidou, & Kyrianidou, 2007; Avraamides, Theodorou, Agathokleus, & Nicolaou, 2013; c.f. 
Wang, 2005). Further, Galati, Michael, Mello, Greenauer, and Avraamides (2013) provide 
evidence that speakers do learn and store representations of their future conversation partner’s 
spatial viewpoint, when it is made available to them in advance. However, the nature of these 
representations and how they are stored and accessed may differ substantially between speakers 
and listeners. The task of the speakers is to put into words the spatial perspective that they have 
chosen to adopt whereas the listeners must remain flexible enough in their representations to 
adapt to whichever unknown perspective they are about to hear an instruction from (e.g., the 
speaker might turn out to be egocentric and say “I’ll be to the right of Sixth Street,” rather than 
“From Sixth Street, you’ll take a left on Daniel Street.”). 
 
Spatial Perspective-taking during Language Processing 
The challenges involved in representing others’ spatial perspectives are well documented. 
Yet, the comprehension processes involved in interpreting spatial language from a perspective 
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that differs from one’s own are less well understood. It is clear that speakers often produce 
spatial language from the intended recipient’s perspective and that listeners (or readers) can 
come to understand spatial directions that are given from a different perspective (Schober, 1993; 
Tversky & Hard, 2009; Taylor & Tversky, 1992). Yet, little is know about the mechanisms 
involved in, or the time-course of, adopting a different perspective during comprehension of 
spatial language.  
The integration of an occlusion-based difference in perspectives occurs rapidly during 
sentence interpretation (e.g., Heller et al., 2008). However, the processes involved in computing 
a differing perspective are not the same when that difference is the result of occlusion compared 
to when it stems from an alternative spatial orientation (Michelon & Zacks, 2006). Occlusion 
prompts participants to use a simple line-of-sight tracing strategy to compute the differences 
between their perspective and that of their partner. By contrast, when spatial perspectives are 
misaligned, participants must undergo an imagined transformation of their perspective and 
remapping of reference frames, which may lead to a conflict between the imagined and 
egocentric reference frames. Thus, spatial perspective-taking and occlusion-based perspective-
taking may differently guide the on-line comprehension of utterances.  
Nonetheless, some evidence suggests that listeners are able to use information about a 
speaker’s spatial viewpoint to constrain the interpretation of a sentence as it unfolds. Ryskin, 
Brown-Schmidt, Canseco-Gonzalez, Yiu, & Nguyen (2014) monitored the eye movements of 
listeners as they processed sentences with potentially ambiguous spatial language. Participants 
heard instructions to move objects around a complex display of animals with accessories (e.g., a 
hat, a purse). The instructions, such as “Go left to the pig with the hat,” were given either from 
the participant’s egocentric perspective (i.e., “left” = participant’s left) or the opposite 
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perspective (a 180° rotation; “left” = participant’s right). The displays were designed such that 
instructions were temporarily ambiguous between two potential referents. For example, “the pig 
with the...” was temporarily consistent with two different pigs on the screen, one of which was 
located to the left of the starting position (e.g., a pig with a hat), and the other was located to the 
right of the starting position (e.g., a pig with a purse). Critically, this temporary ambiguity could 
be resolved early by integrating the speaker’s perspective on-line during comprehension. 
Analysis of eye-gaze to the potential referents revealed that instructions that were generated from 
the opposite spatial perspective posed challenges and delayed processing. However, despite these 
challenges, participants showed a clear target preference well before the onset of the 
disambiguating word (e.g., hat), demonstrating that even when spatial perspectives are 
misaligned, listeners are able to use knowledge about the speaker’s spatial viewpoint to interpret 
their utterances as they unfold.  
Though we know that listeners can remember one speaker’s spatial perspective and use it 
to interpret language online, little else is known about how comprehension processes and spatial 
perspective-taking processes interact. How might a listener represent multiple perspectives and 
switch between them, as one often has to do when conversing with multiple people who all have 
varying perspectives on the visual array in question (see Figure 2)? Additionally, is the task of 
tracking these perspectives made more difficult when the speakers’ perspectives are more 
dissimilar from the listener’s (e.g., a 135° rotation vs. a 45° rotation)?  
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Figure 2. Example scenario where a listener must comprehend spatial language produced by 
multiple speakers. Speaker One, Two, and Three have different spatial perspectives and will 
likely take turns talking, so the Listener must flexibly switch between their perspectives. The 
Speakers are unlikely to get up and switch places so their spatial perspectives are strongly tied to 
their identity. Speaker Three’s perspective is more similar to the Listener’s perspective than 
Speaker One and Speaker Two’s. 
 
Because a given speaker’s viewpoint is likely to be relatively stable over the course of a 
conversation, listeners can predict, with some certainty, that their conversational partner will 
continue using the same perspective throughout the dialogue. It may then be computationally 
efficient to store memories of an interlocutor’s spatial perspective along with other cues tied to 
speaker identity. Previous findings of angular disparity effects (e.g., Kessler & Thomson, 2010; 
Kessler & Rutherford, 2010; Surtees et al., 2013) indicate that storing or accessing this 
representation will be more challenging when it requires a larger rotation. In Chapter 3, I 
examine whether listeners encode spatial perspectives that differ from their own in a partner-
specific way. 
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Learning the Pragmatics of Using Visual Context 
 
Another way in which the language processing system resolves the challenge of 
ambiguity is through the use of referential context. Speakers are sensitive to the visual context in 
which they are about to refer to an item (Olson, 1970). When referring to a particular object, 
speakers attend to the contrasts that are present in their visual field and design definite referring 
expressions in order to unambiguously pick out the intended referent with respect to those 
contrasts. Cues to contrast can appear in the forms of modifiers or prosodic contours, among 
others. For example, when describing a tall glass in the context of an unrelated item such as a 
teddy bear, speakers will use the bare noun phrase, the glass, to ask for it. On the other hand, 
when the context item is a shorter glass, speakers will distinguish the tall from the short glass 
using a scalar adjective: the tall glass. Similarly, speakers may use a prosodic contour known as 
L+H*, characterized by an initial drop in F0 followed by a steep rise (Beckman & Ayers, 1997; 
Pierrehumbert & Hirschberg, 1990), to distinguish an intended referent from a contrasting 
alternative, as in “not the short glass, but the TALL [L+H*] one” (e.g., Watson, Tanenhaus, & 
Gunlogson, 2008).  
Evidence from the visual world paradigm indicates that listeners rapidly integrate 
contrast information into the comprehension process (Sedivy et al., 1999). While interpreting the 
ambiguous portion of a sentence such as “Pick up the big cup” (i.e., “Pick up the big…”), 
listeners make more fixations to the big cup if there is an item in a size contrast with it (i.e., a 
small cup) on the screen. Scalar adjectives, in particular, are interpreted contrastively, whereas 
color adjectives do not always lead to the inference that a contrast is present in the scene 
(Eberhard, Spivey-Knowlton, Sedivy, & Tanenhaus, 1995; Sedivy, 2003).  
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Multiple proposals have been put forth about the mechanism driving this interpretive 
process and the rapid anticipatory eye-movements associated with it. On the one hand, the 
semantic information extracted from a size adjective may automatically trigger fixations to pairs 
of objects. On the other hand, listeners may be looking at the pair of size-contrasted objects 
because they are drawing an inference about the speaker’s intent, namely, that the speaker would 
not have used the size adjective if the referent were not in a contrast set.  If pragmatic 
interpretation plays a role, then the anticipatory eye-movements should be diminished when the 
listener has no reason to infer that the speaker’s use of an adjective reflects contrastive intent.  
Grodner and Sedivy (2011) examined whether the listener’s contrastive interpretation of 
scalar adjectives could be canceled in a situation where information about the speaker points to 
their use of scalar adjectives being infelicitous. Participants engaged in a task modeled after 
Sedivy et al. (1999), where they heard pre-recorded instructions such as “Pick up the tall glass” 
and observed four-picture displays that either contained the target and a size-contrasting item 
(e.g., a tall glass and a short glass; Contrast condition) or just the target item (No Contrast 
condition). Critically, half of the participants were in the Infelicitous Speaker condition and the 
other half in the Felicitous Speaker condition. In the Infelicitous Speaker condition, participants 
were told that the instructions were recorded by a speaker with “an impairment that caused 
language and social problems,” the speaker mislabeled objects and referred to inappropriate 
locations, and the speaker was consistently over-informative in the use of size adjectives. In the 
Felicitous Speaker condition, no information was provided about the speaker’s mental status, the 
speaker made no labeling errors, and was only over-informative in the critical No Contrast trials. 
Listeners in the Felicitous Speaker condition made more fixations to a modified target item (e.g., 
tall cup) when a contrast item (e.g., short cup) was present, replicating Sedivy et al. (1999).  
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However, listeners in the Infelicitous Speaker condition did not have differential fixation patterns 
in the Contrast and No Contrast conditions, suggesting that they were not drawing a contrastive 
inference from the scalar adjectives when the speaker was known to be infelicitous. This result 
lends support to the idea that pragmatic inference plays a role in the interpretation of size 
adjectives. Similarly, Kurumada, Brown, Bibyk, Pontillo, and Tanenhaus (2014) exposed 
subjects to speakers who used prosodic cues to contrast felicitously (e.g., “Show me the yellow 
square. Now, show me the GREEN square.”), or infelicitously (e.g., “Show me the yellow 
square. Now, show me the YELLOW circle.”). When the speaker was infelicitous, a subsequent 
test found that listeners did not draw pragmatic inferences when they heard an L+H* accent in a 
new task with the same speaker. However, if the speaker used prosody felicitously during the 
exposure phase, listeners interpreted the L+H* accent contrastively (Ito & Speer, 2008; Watson 
et al., 2008). Consistent with recent proposals that adaptation constitutes a key mechanism 
allowing listeners to make sense of the tremendous variability in the input (Kleinschmidt & 
Jaeger, 2015), this work suggests that listeners adapt their language models to the features of a 
particular speaker. When a speaker is known to produce utterances that disrupt the 
comprehension process, listeners refrain from anticipating the intended meaning.  
Grodner and Sedivy (2011) used an explicit instructional manipulation to convey 
unreliability of the speaker’s use of scalar adjectives. In daily life it is very rare to be provided 
with a top-down characterization of a speaker’s pragmatic intent. An open question is whether 
listeners can learn about the features of a speaker’s use of adjectives from exposure alone and 
then apply this newly learned pragmatic information during on-line comprehension of referring 
expressions. This is the question that I aim to address in Experiments 5 and 6. 
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According to Gricean principles (Grice, 1975), listeners typically expect their 
interlocutors to be cooperative and provide appropriately informative descriptions. Thus, creating 
a context in which listeners discard this expectation may be difficult. Aditionally, adapting 
quickly to an infelicitous speaker would allow for more efficient comprehension, but over-
generalizing and discarding expectations of cooperativity after only a few instances of 
infelicitous speech would be inefficient as well. Due to the need to strike a balance between 
relying on well-founded expectations and adapting to new evidence, listeners may require top-
down knowledge or overwhelming bottom-up evidence to change their pragmatic inferences. 
The results from Kurumada et al. (2014) suggest that a more bottom-up route to forming a new 
speaker model is viable, though this may differ by domain. Pragmatic information conveyed by 
prosodic cues may be more variable by speaker to begin with (Pierrehumbert, 1980) and thus 
more susceptible to felicity manipulations.   
A second question concerns the generalizability of pragmatic learning. Pogue, Kurumada, 
& Tanenhaus (2016) find that listeners expect under-informative referential expressions to have 
been produced by speakers that have previously been under-informative. Critically, these 
expectations extend to new scalar modifiers. But, will this expectation transfer across domains? 
In Experiments 5a and 5b, I test whether listeners can learn that speakers are infelicitous in their 
cues to contrast across domains or whether this learning is restricted to the domain from which 
they have evidence. It may be advantageous for the listener to infer that a speaker who produces 
infelicitous prosodic cues is also likely to produce infelicitous modifiers. This would allow faster 
adaptation of the speaker model based on fewer bits of evidence. On the other hand, extending 
expectations of infelicity to new linguistic domains for which there is no prior evidence may lead 
to less efficient processing if the generalization is not warranted. Results from these studies 
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provide important insights into how the language processing system strikes a balance between 
rapid adaptation and over-generalization.  
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CHAPTER 2: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN MEMORY AND VISUAL 
PERSPECTIVE-TAKING 
The goal of this experiment and its re-analysis is to evaluate the contribution of 
individual differences in memory and executive function to performance during an on-line 
perspective-taking task. To do so, we measured perspective-taking in language comprehension 
using a conversation task in which both members of a conversational dyad were naïve 
participants whose eye-movements were monitored. We also collected measures of perspective-
taking during cue generation and language production, as well as measures of individual 
differences in working memory, cued recall, inhibitory control, and cognitive failures in 
everyday life. The results of Experiment 1 were reported in Ryskin, Benjamin, Tullis, and 
Brown-Schmidt (2015). 
 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
 One hundred fifty-two undergraduate students at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign participated in this experiment in exchange for partial course credit. This large 
sample size was necessary for an amply powered examination of individual differences. 
Participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were self-reported native speakers of 
English. 
Materials and design 
 Participants were recruited in pairs and both came in for two sessions that were 48 hours 
apart. Members of each pair did not know each other beforehand. During the first session, which 
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lasted approximately one hour, participants generated mnemonic cues for the cue generation task 
and completed four executive function tasks. During the second session, participants were given 
the cues that they had generated on the first day and attempted to recall the corresponding targets 
for each item.  Next, they completed a cued recall task and a questionnaire. Finally, they took 
part in the conversation task as a pair. The second session lasted about two hours.  
Cue Generation. The cue generation task was made up of two parts—the study session 
and the test session—that were separated by a 48-hour delay. This delay ensures that 
participants’ performance is not at ceiling and has been used in previous work with this task 
(Tullis and Benjamin, 2015a, 2015b). During the study session, participants saw 80 words one at 
a time, in random order. They were told to generate a one-word cue for each target word. 
Participants were informed that they would be tested on all the target words later and that they 
should pick cues that would be most helpful to them for retrieving the target.  They were not 
allowed to use the target itself as a cue, but the selection was otherwise unconstrained.  
During the test session, participants were presented with the 80 cue words they had 
generated in a new random order. They were asked to recall the target that corresponded to each 
cue. In both sessions, participants typed in responses and proceeded through the task at their own 
pace. 
Target words were collected from the University of South Florida Free Association 
Norms (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998). As in Tullis and Benjamin (2015a, 2015b), these 
to-be-remembered words were selected with the intention that college-aged subjects would have 
some personal experiences with the items. Sixty of the target words were identical to those used 
by Tullis and Benjamin (2015b). Examples of words include “dancing,” “haircut,” and 
“roommate.” Learners generated cues such as “ballet,” “mohawk,” and “maggie.”  The 
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Thorndike-Lorge written frequencies of the targets ranged from 27 to 2218, with a mean of 536 
and a standard deviation of 510.  
Conversation Task.  The conversation task was used to measure perspective-taking in 
both language production and comprehension. The focus of this dissertation will be primarily on 
the comprehension data. During the task, participants were seated in separate rooms but 
communicated with each other via wireless microphones. Partners saw identical 3 x 3 grids with 
eight objects and a fixation cross in the center (Figure 3a). They were told to imagine that their 
partner was sitting on the other side of a physical grid with cubbyholes (similar to Heller et al., 
2008). The displays were mirror-reversed such that, from each participant’s perspective, the 
items were positioned as if they were indeed looking at opposite sides of a grid of cubbies. 
Participants were informed that a gray background in a cell indicated that their partner couldn’t 
see that object; these items were in the participant’s privileged ground. Conversely, a black cell 
indicated that their partner could see something in that cell (i.e., it had a gray background on 
their partner’s display and was in their partner’s privileged ground). The target item was circled 
on the speaker’s display. Participants randomly alternated telling each other which item on the 
screen to click on. Each room was equipped with an Eyelink-1000 desktop-mounted eye-tracker 
so that eye movements, as well as synchronized voice recordings, were collected for both 
participants throughout the conversation task.  
Collecting both speech and eye-tracking data from both participants allowed us to 
evaluate the perspective-taking ability of both participants in both language production and 
comprehension. This feature of the design affords—for the first time in the substantial literature 
on conversation—a within-subjects comparison of perspective-taking in language production and 
comprehension. The conversation task consisted of 288 trials and lasted about one hour. One-
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third (96) of the trials constituted critical trials for one participant in the pair, another third of 
these trials constituted critical trials for the other participant in the pair, and one-third were filler 
trials. All trial types were randomly intermingled. Stimulus presentation for all tasks, except for 
the questionnaire, which was on paper, was controlled using the Psychophysics Toolbox Version 
3 (PTB-3; Brainard, 1997) for MATLAB. 
Language Comprehension. Perspective-taking during comprehension was measured by 
monitoring listeners’ eye movements while their partner provided an instruction. On critical 
comprehension trials, the speaker’s display was always unambiguous with respect to the 
instruction they were intended to produce (i.e., critical production trials were not used as stimuli 
for comprehension). The rate of production errors on these trials was low (6%) and trials 
containing speaker errors were not included in the analyses of comprehension data1. In other 
words, we can be confident that the instruction given, though unscripted, provided an appropriate 
auditory stimulus. 
The three critical conditions2 (Figure 3a-c) were modeled after Heller et al. (2008), and 
were designed to assess the listener’s sensitivity to the speaker’s perspective. Across conditions, 
listeners always heard an instruction that included a size modifier and a target object to click on 
(e.g., “Click on the big banana”). In the Two Contrasts-Shared condition (Figure 3a), listeners 
saw two sets of items that formed a size contrast (e.g., a big banana, a small banana, a big 
																																																								
1 All the analyses were also done with speaker error trials included and the results did not differ. The reliability of 
the individual measure of perspective-taking in comprehension was slightly improved when the error trials were 
excluded so all analyses reported here do not include the 6% of trials with errors. 
2 There were two other “comprehension” conditions during which the participant acted as a listener but these trials 
were not of interest in terms of the analysis of perspective-driven eye movements. On these trials, the listeners often 
heard an instruction with no size modifier (e.g., “Click on the banana”) and there was no temporary referential 
ambiguity because the listener only saw one instance of the target item (e.g., there was only one banana on their 
screen). The purpose of these trials was simply to provide a recipient for the partner’s critical production trials. 
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balloon, and a small balloon)3 and three other filler items on the screen. One of the filler items 
was in the listener’s privileged ground (indicated by the gray background) and the contents of 
one cell were hidden from the listener (indicated by the black square). The competitor—for all 
conditions—was defined as the item that was also part of a contrast set and the same size as the 
target (e.g., the big balloon when the big banana was the target). In the Two Contrasts-Privileged 
condition (Figure 3b), listeners saw two sets of items that formed a size contrast (e.g., a big 
balloon, a small balloon, a big banana and a small banana) and three other filler items on the 
screen. Critically, the item that contrasted in size with the competitor (i.e., the small balloon 
when the competitor is the big balloon) was in privileged ground (indicated by the gray 
background). The contents of one cell were hidden from the listener (indicated by the black 
square). In the One Contrast condition (Figure 3c), listeners saw one set of items that formed a 
size contrast (e.g., a big banana and a small banana), one item that was cohort and size 
competitor for the target (e.g., a big balloon) and four filler items. One of the filler items was in 
privileged ground (indicated by the gray background) and the contents of one cell were hidden 
from the listener (indicated by the black square).  
																																																								
3 Note that the two items (balloon and banana) are phonological cohort competitors. Trials were constructed in this 
way so that the point of disambiguation (e.g., between “big balloon” and “big banana”) occurred slightly later than 
the onset of the word, giving us more time to observe any effects due to perspective-taking. 
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a. Two Contrasts - Shared b. Two. Contrasts - Privileged c. One Contrast 
Figure 3. Sample displays from the three critical conditions during the comprehension trials of the conversation task.  
 
 
a. Contrast - Shared b. Contrast - Privileged c. No Contrast 
Figure 4. Sample displays from the three critical conditions during the production trials of the conversation task. 
+" +" +"
+" +" +"
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Language Production. Perspective-taking during language production was 
measured using the speakers’ correct use of size adjectives given the visual context. The 
three critical4 conditions (Figure 4) were modeled after Nadig and Sedivy (2002). A 
green circle appeared around one of the objects on the screen and speakers instructed 
their partner to click on that object.  In the Contrast-Shared condition, the display 
contained two5 sets of items that formed a size contrast (e.g., a big banana, a small 
banana, a big balloon, and a small balloon) and three other filler items on the screen. One 
of the filler items was in privileged ground (indicated by the gray background) and the 
contents of one cell were hidden from the speaker (indicated by the black square). The 
target item—circled in green—was part of a size contrast (e.g., the big banana). The 
correct instruction in this case is “Click on the big banana” because the listener sees two 
different-sized bananas. This production condition is equivalent to the Two Contrasts-
Shared comprehension condition. In the Contrast-Privileged condition, the display 
contained two sets of items that formed a size contrast (e.g., a big banana, a small banana, 
a big balloon, and a small balloon) and three other filler items on the screen. Critically, 
the item that contrasted in size with the target (i.e., the small banana) was in privileged 
ground (indicated by the gray background). The contents of one cell were hidden from 
the participant (indicated by the black square). The correct instruction in this case was 
“Click on the banana” because the listener only sees one banana, despite the fact that the 
																																																								
4 There were two other production conditions during which the participant gave instructions but these trials 
were not of interest for the analysis of perspective-driven utterances. On these trials, speakers saw one 
contrast set (e.g., big balloon, small balloon) and the target was one item in that pair such that (similar to 
Two Contrasts – Shared) they should produce an instruction with a size modifier (e.g., “Click on the big 
balloon”). The purpose of these trials was simply to provide the auditory stimulus for the partner’s critical 
comprehension trials (Two Contrasts – Privileged and One Contrast). 
5 Note that only one of the contrast sets – the one including the target – was relevant to the utterance 
production. 
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speaker sees two. In the No Contrast condition, speakers saw one target item (e.g., a big 
banana), one set of items that formed a size contrast (e.g., a big balloon and a small 
balloon), and four filler items. One of the filler items was in privileged ground (indicated 
by the gray background) and the contents of one cell were hidden from the speaker 
(indicated by the black square). The correct instruction in this case was “Click on the 
banana” because the listener and speaker only see one banana. 
Each critical trial consisted of a random pairing of condition (comprehension: 
Two Contrasts-Shared, Two Contrasts-Privileged, One Contrast, or production: Contrast-
Shared, Contrast-Privileged, No Contrast) and cohort set (e.g., banana-balloon, ant-anvil). 
The Two Contrasts-Shared/Contrast-Shared condition was critical for both 
comprehension and production trials. So as not to diminish the statistical power of our 
analyses, we made it into two conditions (one critical for production, the other for 
comprehension). Therefore, there are 32 trials of Two Contrasts-Shared, 16 of Two 
Contrasts-Privileged, and 16 of One Contrast for each participant’s eye-movement data. 
There are also 32 trials of Contrast-Shared (the same trials as the 32 Two Contrasts-
Shared trials), 16 of Contrast-Privileged, and 16 of No Contrast for each participant’s 
production data.  
Individual Differences. During the first session, participants completed four tasks 
measuring individual differences in executive function. These tasks were chosen to be 
similar to those used in prior work linking perspective-taking and executive function 
(Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Wardlow, 2013; Nilsen & Graham, 2009). In addition, two 
measures of individual differences in memory were collected during the second session. 
The six measures are listed below: 
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1. Stroop Task One: Participants viewed color words presented in a colored text 
that did not match the meaning of the word. For instance, the word “green” might 
appear in blue text. In the first block of trials, participants were instructed to 
simply read the word and say it out loud (e.g., “green”). In the second block, they 
were instructed to ignore the word and say the color of the text out loud (e.g., 
“blue”). Across the two blocks, the word and the color of the text were always 
incongruent. Each color word appeared on the screen for 700ms and participants’ 
spoken responses were recorded throughout. Recordings were later hand-coded 
for accuracy; the proportion of correct responses across the two blocks was used 
as a measure of inhibitory control. 
2. Stroop Task Two: Participants viewed color words presented in a colored text 
in front of a patch of color. For instance, the word “green” might appear in blue 
text in front of a red rectangle. In the first block of trials, participants were 
instructed to ignore the word and say the color of the patch out loud (e.g., “red”). 
In the second block of trials, participants were instructed to ignore the word and 
say the color of the text out loud (e.g., “blue”). All trials were self-paced and 
participants’ reaction times (latency of button press to advance to the next trial) 
and spoken responses were recorded throughout. The first block was 15% 
congruent (i.e., the patch color matched the word) and the second block was 51% 
congruent (i.e., the color of the word matched the word). Each participant 
received an interference score, obtained by subtracting the average reaction time 
for saying the patch color from the average reaction time for saying the text color. 
Thus, a lower score signified less interference of the incongruent color word or 
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superior inhibitory control. These scores were recoded so that a higher score on 
Stroop Two (as well as Stroop One) indicated superior inhibitory control. 
3. Minus-Two Span Task: In this working memory span task, participants saw a 
set of numbers, one by one. After each set they were asked to recall (and type in), 
in order, the numbers they had just viewed, subtracting two from each number. 
The set size varied from two to seven. Each set size was used twice for a total of 
twelve blocks. The score was determined by adding together the proportions 
correct for each block. For instance, if the participant recalled four items from the 
block of six correctly, that block would receive a score of 4/6. The maximum 
possible score was twelve. 
4. Operation Span Task: This working memory task was modeled after one 
described by Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, and Engle (2005). Participants saw a set 
of math problems (e.g., (3 x 2) + 4 =?) followed by a number (e.g., 9). They were 
told to respond “True” (by pressing a keyboard key) if that number was the 
answer to the preceding math problem and “False” if it was not (in this case, 
“False”). After each response they saw a letter (e.g., R). At the end of a set, they 
were asked to recall and type in all the letters they had seen in that set, in order. 
Participants were told to maintain their accuracy on the math problems above 
85% and were given feedback about their accuracy throughout the task. Pacing 
was calibrated to each subject by averaging their speed of response to practice 
math problems and using a speed that was 2.5 standard deviations above that 
average. The set size varied from three to seven. Each set size was used three 
times for a total of fifteen blocks. The score was determined by adding together 
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the proportions correct for each block. For instance, if the participant recalled four 
letters from the block of six correctly, that block would receive a score of 4/6. The 
maximum possible score was fifteen. 
5. Cued Recall Task: In this task, participants studied forty pairs of words (e.g., 
bitter – lemon) on the screen for three seconds each. They were told to try to 
remember them for a later test. After they studied the forty pairs, they were given 
the left word from each pair (e.g., bitter - ?) and were asked to type in the right-
side member of the pair. Number of words recalled correctly was used as a 
measure of basic memory recall ability.  
6. Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ): The questionnaire is intended to 
measure the rate of a person’s memory deficits, absent-mindedness and slips of 
action in daily life (Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald, & Parkes, 1982), because such 
events presumably relate to one’s ability to engage in successful perspective-
taking in more ecologically relevant circumstances than those measured by the 
word-list procedure. It contains questions such as: “Do you find you confuse left 
and right when giving directions?”, “Do you find you forget appointments?”, “Do 
you daydream when you ought to be listening to something?” Answers are given 
on a 0 (Never) to 4 (Very often) scale, and each participant’s score consists of the 
sum of their responses on all twenty-five questions. 
Predictions 
Perspective-taking effects 
 In the cue generation task, if participants can take the perspective of their future 
selves, they will create effective cues for themselves and retrieve a substantial number of 
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targets despite the two-day delay between study and test. I also expect that cues that lead 
to successful retrieval will be characterized by their idiosyncracy and distinctiveness 
(Tullis & Benjamin, 2015b). 
 If participants can take into account their partner’s perspective during on-line 
language comprehension, they will be more likely to fixate the target in the Two 
Contrasts-Privileged condition than the Two Contrasts-Shared condition, because the 
speaker’s use of an adjective will only be consistent with one possible referent in the 
display when a member of a size contrast pair is in privileged ground. I also expect that 
participants will be most likely to fixate the target in the One Contrast condition because 
only one item will be consistent with the speaker’s use of an adjective—no other size 
contrasts appear in the display. 
 If participants can tailor their utterances to the perspective of their partner, they 
will use an adjective to describe the target referent more frequently in the Contrast-
Shared condition than the Contrast-Privileged condition, because in the Contrast-
Privileged condition the referent is fully disambiguated without the use of an adjective. I 
also expect participants to use an adjective very infrequently in the No Contrast condition 
because the target is not in a size contrast with anything else in the display. 
Relationships between tasks 
Given prior findings of a link between executive function and working memory 
and perspective-taking, I predict that performance on the Stroop tasks, the Operation 
Span task, and the Minus Two Span task should predict perspective-taking ability in 
comprehension. If successful perspective-taking in conversation relies on the same 
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perspective-taking ability as the cue generation task and language production task, then I 
would expect individual differences across the three tasks to correlate. 
Results 
Evidence for perspective-taking in three domains 
Cue Generation. Performance on the cue generation task was based upon strict 
scoring, such that only the responses that matched the target identically were counted as 
correct. For example, if the target was “dancer”, “dance” would be counted as incorrect. 
On average, participants retrieved 42.13 (SD=13.62) of the 80 target words they had 
generated cues for.  
Two major characteristics of learner-generated cues were measured: (1) the 
association between cue and target and (2) cue overload. Cue-to-target associative 
strength was determined using the normative cue-to-target associative strength found in 
the University of South Florida Free Association Norms (Nelson, et al., 1998). Cued 
recall performance typically increases as cue-to-target associative strength in a word pair 
increases (Feldman & Underwood, 1957). Second, cue overload, or the number of 
possible targets associated with each cue, was measured by counting the total number of 
targets in the Free Association Norms associated with each cue, by summing the cue-to-
target associative strengths from the cue to all possible targets in the database, and by 
counting whether the cue was in the database at all. Cues that are associated to fewer 
possible targets limit the search space during recall and are typically associated with 
better memory performance (Anderson, 1974). The characteristics of successful vs. 
unsuccessful cues are summarized in Table 14 in the Appendix. As expected and as 
shown in prior literature (Tullis & Benjamin, 2015a), cues that lead to later successful 
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retrieval had higher cue-to-target associative strength, a lower number of associates from 
cue, lower total associative strength from cue, and were less likely to be in the database. 
This suggests that when learners tailored their cues to be more normatively associated, 
but also idiosyncratic and distinctive, they were more successful at retrieving the target. 
 To assess how consistent participants are in the cue generation task, we measured 
coefficient α (the mean of all possible split-half reliabilities) using the psych package in R 
(Revelle, 2014). The results of this analysis indicate that the cue generation task is a 
highly reliable measure of participants’ ability to generate effective cues for later retrieval 
(α = 0.9, 95% CI = [0.88, 0.93]). 
Language Comprehension. To assess perspective-taking during comprehension, 
we measured the eye movements that listeners made as they interpreted the speaker’s 
instruction (e.g., Click on the big banana). The time-course of target and competitor 
fixations across conditions can be seen in Figure 5. Eye movements associated with the 
interpretation of the instruction were analyzed in terms of a binary measure: whether the 
participant fixated the target during the specified time window or not.6 A fixation was 
coded as a fixation to the target referent if the x,y fixation coordinates landed within the 
cell containing the target object (e.g., the big banana).
																																																								
6 Note that eye-gaze analyses in the visual world paradigm sometimes use a proportion measure (proportion of target 
fixations in a time-window). We used a different approach because inspection of the trial-by-trial proportion-based 
measure revealed that the data distribution was highly zero-inflated and would violate the linear model assumption of 
normally distributed residuals. Further, a binary measure of comprehension is more analogous to the production 
measure used in this paper, which is also binary (whether speakers use an adjective or not). Because our goal here is to 
compare these two measures, the binary comprehension measure is preferred. 
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Figure 5. Proportion of fixations to targets and competitors over time, during interpretation of an instruction (e.g., “Click on the big 
banana.”). The gray dashed lines indicate the approximate time-window used for analysis, beginning 200ms after the onset of the 
adjective (e.g., “big”). 
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Target fixations were measured in one time window (average duration 1100 
milliseconds) that began at the onset of the scalar adjective (e.g., big) and ended 600 
milliseconds after the onset of the noun (e.g., banana); the average duration of the noun 
was 600 milliseconds. This large analysis window allows us to examine the full 
interpretive process occurring as the participant learns which item is the target. The time-
window was offset by 200 milliseconds due to the time needed to program and launch an 
eye movement (Hallett, 1986).  
Target fixations were analyzed in a multilevel logistic regression, using the lme4 
software package in R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). The three conditions 
(Two Contrasts-Shared, Two Contrasts-Privileged, and One Contrast) were entered in the 
fixed effects as weighted orthogonal contrast codes. The first contrast compares Two 
Contrasts-Shared and Two Contrasts-Privileged with the One Contrast condition, and was 
used to test for the presence of a competition effect (fewer target fixations) in the 
presence of a second size-contrast set. The second contrast compares Two Contrasts-
Shared to Two Contrasts-Privileged. The second contrast was our critical comparison, 
and tested the ability of listeners to use perspective information to eliminate the second 
size-contrast set from consideration. Subjects and cohort pairs (e.g., banana - balloon) 
were entered as crossed random effects with by-subject and by-cohort pair random slopes 
for condition. 
Within the selected time-window, listeners were less likely to fixate the target 
(e.g., the big banana) when they were in one of the Two Contrast conditions than in the 
One Contrast condition (Table 1). Critically, listeners were less likely to fixate the target 
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when they were in the Two Contrast-Shared condition than when they were in the Two 
Contrast-Privileged condition. This latter finding shows that listeners successfully took 
into account the speaker’s perspective, reducing consideration of the contrast object (big 
balloon) when the small balloon was privileged ground (as there would be no need for the 
speaker to say the size of the balloon in that case). 
Fixed Effects β SE z-value p-value 
(Intercept) 1.393 0.064 21.720 < 2.00 e-16 
Two v. One Contrast(s) -0.414 0.119 -3.491 0.0005 * 
Shared v. Privileged -0.247 0.115 -2.150 0.032 * 
     
Random Effects  Variance   
Subjects (Intercept) 0.230   
 Two v. One Contrast(s) 0.282   
 Shared v. Privileged 0.070   
Cohort Pairs (Intercept) 0.172   
 Two v. One Contrast(s) 0.684   
 Shared v. Privileged 0.773   
Number of observations: 8466; Groups: Subjects, 152; Cohort Pairs, 96 
Table 1. Effect of Condition on binary measure of target fixations (* indicates a 
significant effect and † indicates a marginal effect at an α level of 0.05 unless otherwise 
specified) 
 
In order to examine individual differences related to this comprehension measure 
it is important to first assess its reliability as a measure of perspective-taking. To 
determine how consistent these effects are within a subject, we split the data in two 
halves based on odd and even trial numbers and extracted each subject’s random slopes 
for both contrasts. The Spearman-Brown adjusted correlation between the Two Contrasts 
v. One Contrast random slopes of each half was ρ*=0.29. The Spearman-Brown adjusted 
correlation between the Shared v. Privileged random slopes of each half was ρ*=0.497. 
Note that a measure is typically considered internally reliable if its reliability is larger 																																																								
7 Reliabilities for the individual conditions were higher (Two Contrasts-Shared: ρ*=0.6, Two Contrasts-
Privileged: ρ*=0.6, One Contrast: ρ*=0.7) 
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than 0.7 (Nunnally, 1978); this convention is derived primarily from psychometric testing 
and may not offer a useful benchmark for experimental measures of language processing. 
To my knowledge, there has been very little prior investigation of the reliability of 
experimental effects in the language domain. This level of reliability does, however, 
place an upper bound on the magnitude of the relationship that this measure can bear with 
other measures. 
Language production. The dependent measure used to index speakers’ 
appreciation of their partner’s perspective was the presence or absence of a size adjective 
in their production of an instruction (e.g., “Click on the big banana” vs. “Click on the 
banana”), in response to a target item being circled on the screen. On average, 
participants produced a size adjective 97% of the time in the Contrast-Shared condition, 
65% of the time in the Contrast-Privileged condition and 8% of the time in the No 
Contrast condition. Recall that successful perspective-taking would be indicated by not 
using a size-adjective in the Contrast-Privileged condition (as the listener only saw one, 
e.g., banana). 
Adjective use was analyzed in a multilevel logistic regression. The three 
conditions were entered in the fixed effects as weighted orthogonal contrast codes. The 
first contrast compared Contrast-Shared and Contrast-Privileged with the No Contrast 
condition, and examines sensitivity of adjective use to the presence of a second size-
contrast in the scene. The second contrast was our critical comparison, and compared 
Contrast-Shared with Contrast-Privileged. Successful perspective-taking would be 
indicated by fewer size-adjectives in the Contrast-Privileged condition. Subjects and 
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cohort pairs (e.g., banana-balloon) were entered as crossed random effects with by-
subject and by-cohort pair random slopes for condition. 
Participants were more likely to use a size adjective when they were in one of the 
Contrast conditions than in the No Contrast condition (Table 2). Critically, speakers took 
perspective: they were significantly less likely to mention target object size in the 
Contrast-Privileged condition vs. the Contrast-Shared condition. 
Fixed Effects β SE z-value p-value 
(Intercept) 1.49 0.13 11.44 <2e-16 
Contrast v. No Contrast 6.91 0.24 28.70 <2e-16 * 
Shared v. Privileged 3.13 0.27 11.50 <2e-16 * 
     
Random Effects  Variance   
Subjects (Intercept) 1.04   
 Contrast v. No Contrast 2.74   
 Shared v. Privileged 6.57   
Cohort Pairs (Intercept) 0.51   
 Contrast v. No Contrast 1.48   
 Shared v. Privileged 1.14   
Number of observations: 9685; Groups: Subjects, 152; Cohort Pairs, 96 
Table 2. Effect of Condition on production of size adjectives 
 
In order to determine how consistent these effects are within a subject, we split 
the data in two halves based on odd and even trial numbers and extracted each subject’s 
random slopes for both contrasts. The Spearman-Brown adjusted correlation between the 
Contrast v. No Contrast random slopes of each half was ρ*=0.68. The Spearman-Brown 
adjusted correlation between the Shared v. Privileged random slopes of each half was 
ρ*=0.89. As opposed to the comprehension measure, the production task provided a 
highly reliable measure of individual perspective-taking ability. 
Individual differences and their link to perspective-taking in comprehension 
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 Descriptive statistics and reliabilities for the individual differences measures can 
be found in Table 15 in the Appendix. Pearson product-moment correlations between all 
measures of individual differences are summarized in the correlation matrix in Table 3.  
 Stroop 
One 
Stroop 
Two 
Minus 
Two Span 
Operation 
Span 
Cued 
Recall 
CFQ 
Stroop One -      
Stroop Two 0.07 -     
Minus Two Span 0.03 0.10 -    
Operation Span 0.21 0.09 0.30* -   
Cued Recall 0.22 0.02 0.21 0.32* -  
CFQ 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.18 - 
Table 3. Correlation matrix for all individual difference measures. All scores were 
centered and standardized. The Stroop One scores were first logit-transformed because 
they were proportions. Asterisks indicate bivariate correlations significant at a 
Bonferroni-corrected alpha level of 0.05/15 = 0.003. See Table 16 in the Appendix for 
disattenuated correlations. 
 
 Mixed-effects logistic regression models were used to assess the contributions of 
individual differences in inhibitory control, working memory, recall, and CFQ to 
performance in the cue generation (Table 4), production (Table 5), and comprehension 
(Table 6) tasks. The multilevel modeling approach provides conservative parameter 
estimates that are adjusted for multiple comparisons (Gelman, Hill, & Yajima, 2012). 
Nonetheless, given that three separate models were fit to the same set of predictors, we 
adjusted the alpha level for the two analyses to follow using the Bonferroni correction for 
multiple comparisons, resulting in an overall alpha level of 0.05/2=0.025. 
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Fixed Effects β SE z-value p-value 
(Intercept) 0.14 0.11 1.27 0.21 
Stroop One 0.11 0.06 1.89 0.06  
Stroop Two -0.13 0.06 -2.20 0.03  
Operation Span 0.17 0.06 2.72 0.01 * 
Minus Two Span 0.00 0.06 -0.04 0.97 
Cued Recall 0.36 0.06 5.71 1.10 e-8 * 
CFQ 0.12 0.06 2.15 0.03  
     
Random Effects  Variance   
Subjects (Intercept) 0.39   
Items (Intercept) 0.71   
Number of observations: 11440; Groups: Subjects, 143; Items, 80 
Table 4. Effects of individual measures of executive function, memory, CFQ on 
successful cue generation. 
 
Fixed Effects β SE z-value p-value 
(Intercept) 3.365 0.134 25.194 <2e-16 
Shared v. Privileged 3.254 0.270 12.060 <2e-16 * 
Stroop One -0.135 0.115 -1.174 0.240 
Stroop Two -0.115 0.111 -1.037 0.300 
Operation Span 0.007 0.118 0.056 0.956 
Minus Two Span -0.044 0.112 -0.395 0.693 
Cued Recall 0.059 0.123 0.480 0.632 
CFQ -0.127 0.112 -1.132 0.258 
Shared v. Privileged x 
Stroop One -0.031 0.252 -0.124 0.902 
Shared v. Privileged x 
Stroop Two -0.086 0.247 -0.348 0.728 
Shared v. Privileged x 
Operation Span 0.675 0.267 2.527 0.012 * 
Shared v. Privileged x 
Minus Two Span 0.178 0.253 0.704 0.482 
Shared v. Privileged x Cued 
Recall 0.289 0.268 1.079 0.281 
Shared v. Privileged x CFQ -0.157 0.247 -0.637 0.524 
     
Random Effects  Variance   
Subjects (Intercept) 0.842   
 Shared v. Privileged 5.812   
Cohort Pairs (Intercept) 0.426   
 Shared v. Privileged 1.068   
Number of observations: 6888; Groups: Subjects, 144; Cohort Pairs, 96 
Table 5. Effects of individual measures of executive function and memory on adjective 
use during production.  
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Fixed Effects β SE z-value p-value 
(Intercept) 1.295 0.068 18.907 <2e-16 * 
Shared v. Privileged -0.261 0.115 -2.264 0.024 † 
Stroop One 0.096 0.047 2.031 0.042 
Stroop Two 0.010 0.047 0.213 0.832 
Operation Span -0.003 0.052 -0.052 0.958 
Minus Two Span -0.104 0.050 -2.071 0.038 
Cued Recall 0.016 0.051 0.322 0.747 
CFQ -0.014 0.047 -0.301 0.764 
Shared v. Privileged x 
Stroop One 
0.017 0.074 0.225 0.822 
Shared v. Privileged x 
Stroop Two 
-0.052 0.073 -0.707 0.480 
Shared v. Privileged x 
Operation Span 
0.002 0.082 0.019 0.985 
Shared v. Privileged x 
Minus Two Span 
-0.034 0.080 -0.424 0.671 
Shared v. Privileged x 
Cued Recall 
-0.120 0.081 -1.480 0.139 
Shared v. Privileged x 
CFQ 
0.060 0.075 0.810 0.418 
     
Random Effects  Variance   
Subjects (Intercept) 0.157   
 Shared v. Privileged 0.075   
Cohort Pairs (Intercept) 0.243   
 Shared v. Privileged 0.745   
Number of observations: 6049; Groups: Subjects, 144; Cohort Pairs, 96 
Table 6. Effects of individual measures of executive function and memory on eye-
movements during comprehension. 
 
Cue Generation. Accuracy on each item (i.e., whether each target word was 
correctly or incorrectly recalled) was used as the dependent measure of performance on 
the cue generation task. A mixed-effects logistic regression was fit with random effects 
for subjects and items (i.e., target words). Successful cue generation was predicted by 
Operation Span and Cued Recall. Participants with larger working memory span and 
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better recall with experimenter-provided cues were more successful at generating cues for 
their future selves.   
Production. In the production task, as before, presence or absence of the size 
adjective in a participant’s utterance was used as the dependent variable. Subjects and 
cohort pairs (e.g., banana-balloon) were entered as random effects. The maximal random 
effects structure justified by the data was fit. Shared v. Privileged condition and all the 
measures of individual differences were entered as fixed effects into a single model. 
Operation Span performance interacted with the Shared vs. Privileged effect, suggesting 
that participants with higher working memory capacity have a larger Shared vs. 
Privileged effect—they are less likely to use the size adjective when it is over-
informative from the listener’s perspective (Contrast-Privileged) and more likely to use 
the size adjective when it is appropriate (Contrast-Shared). Operation Span is the only 
measure that predicts perspective-taking ability in production. 
Comprehension. For the comprehension task, as before, binary target fixations 
within the critical time-window were used as the dependent variable. Subjects and Cohort 
Pairs were entered as random effects. The maximal random effects structure justified by 
the data was fit. The Shared vs. Privileged condition effect and its interactions with all 
the measures of individual differences were entered as fixed effects into a single model. 
No measure of individual differences interacted with the Shared vs. Privileged effect, 
indicating that our measures of executive function and memory did not predict 
perspective-taking ability in comprehension. The lack of significant predictors may be 
partly due to the low reliability of the comprehension measure; the internal reliability of a 
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measure places an upper bound on how much of a relationship there can be between that 
measure and other variables. 
Do individual differences in perspective-taking correlate across domains? 
Individual measures of perspective-taking in language comprehension were 
created by extracting the best linear unbiased predictor for each participant’s random 
coefficient corresponding to the Two Contrast-Shared v. Two Contrast-Privileged 
contrast. In other words, the coefficient indicated how much more each participant 
fixated the target (e.g., big banana) when the competitor (e.g., big balloon) was not as 
plausible by virtue of its size contrast (small balloon) being in privileged ground 
compared to when all relevant objects were in common ground. Similarly, individual 
measures of perspective-taking in language production were created by extracting each 
participant’s random coefficient corresponding to the Contrast-Shared v. Contrast-
Privileged contrast. In other words, the coefficient indicated how much less likely each 
participant was to produce a size adjective (e.g., “Click on the [big] banana”) when the 
other pair member (e.g., small banana) was in privileged ground compared to when it was 
in common ground. Participants’ centered and standardized cue generation score was 
considered to be an individual measure of their perspective-taking during cue generation. 
 Pearson’s product-moment correlations suggest that individual variation is not 
significantly correlated among the three perspective-taking tasks. Note that with our 
sample size (N=152), power to detect an effect size of r=0.2 is 70% (at α=.05, two-
tailed). Perspective-taking in production was marginally correlated with perspective-
taking in cue generation (r=0.16, p=0.05). However, perspective-taking in production 
was not correlated with perspective-taking in comprehension (r=-0.06, p=0.43), nor was 
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perspective-taking in cue generation correlated with perspective-taking in comprehension 
(r=-0.07, p=0.43).8  
Discussion 
These results extend findings from the literature on perspective-taking in 
conversation, as well as the literature on cue generation. Individuals successfully take the 
perspectives of others during production and comprehension tasks and the perspective of 
their future self during cue generation tasks.  However, I find little evidence of working 
memory ability or inhibitory control underlying perspective-taking in comprehension.   
In the cue-generation memory task, participants generated memory cues for 
themselves to use during later retrieval. Learners recalled an average of 41 targets (out of 
80), even after a two-day delay. Cues that led to successful retrieval were strongly 
associated to the target (e.g., cash – money) and more idiosyncratic (e.g., roommate – 
sophia), suggesting that participants effectively tailored their cues to their future 
knowledge state by creating cues that are unique to their long-term semantic memory.  
Equally impressive perspective taking was evident during the conversation task.  I 
found that, while speaking, participants took into account the perspective of their 
conversation partner very effectively. Speakers produced more size adjectives (e.g., 
“Click on the big banana.”) when their partner could see a big and a small version of the 
target object (e.g., a big and a small banana) than when the partner could only see one 
version of the target object. Critically, this was true even in cases where the speaker’s 
own display did contain two versions of the target object (e.g., a big banana in common 
																																																								
8 Correcting for attenuation, there is a correlation of r*=0.18 between perspective-taking in production and 
perspective-taking in cue generation, a correlation of r*=-0.09 between perspective-taking in production 
and perspective-taking in comprehension, and a correlation of r*=-0.11 between perspective-taking in 
comprehension and perspective-taking in cue generation. 
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ground and a small banana in privileged ground), suggesting that participants 
successfully represent the difference between their perspective and their partner’s. 
Furthermore, participants were reliable in their ability to make use of perspective 
information across their utterances. 
Participants’ eye movements during comprehension indicated that listeners took 
into account what information is privileged and what is shared. During interpretation of 
stimulus sentences, participants were more likely to fixate the correct target (e.g., the big 
banana) when there was only one item that the size adjective (e.g., big) could be referring 
to given the speaker’s perspective (e.g., the speaker can see a small banana and a big 
banana, and only one version of every other item). Critically, this was true even when the 
listener’s display—but not the speaker’s—contained two potential referents for the size 
adjective (e.g., the listener sees a small banana and a big banana, as well as a big balloon, 
and a small balloon in privileged ground). To succeed, listeners both formed a 
representation of the speaker’s differing perspective and brought that information to bear 
during interpretation of the speaker’s utterances. While the group level analyses 
demonstrated a significant perspective-taking effect, this comprehension measure did not 
prove to be a reliable measure of individual perspective-taking ability.  
A partial explanation for the lack of a relationship between perspective-taking 
during comprehension and other measures of individual differences may come from the 
fact that, as an index of individual perspective-taking ability, our comprehension measure 
appears to be low in internal reliability (split-half reliability is ρ*=0.49). In contrast, the 
production measure is highly reliable (ρ*=0.89). The relatively low reliability of the 
comprehension measure may be due to the fact that it is derived from eye fixations, 
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which, given their cognitively inexpensive nature, may be more variable from trial to trial 
than explicit verbal responses. However, gaze measures of speech perception have been 
shown to have high internal reliability (Farris-Trimble & McMurray, 2013), suggesting 
that eye-tracking can, in principle, be used fruitfully to examine individual differences 
(see also Henderson & Luke, 2014).  
Another possibility is that the lack of reliability in comprehension-driven eye 
movements points to the more probabilistic nature of mechanisms underlying language 
comprehension in dialogue. Both production and comprehension processes must involve 
the activation of multiple representations. During the production process, the relevant 
representation (e.g., the partner’s perspective) can be in the focus of attention and all 
other representations can be temporarily ignored for the duration of utterance planning. It 
may seem that, in a similar fashion, during comprehension, listeners should attend only to 
what they know to be the speaker’s viewpoint and ignore all other representations. 
However, this may be an inefficient strategy for the listener. If the speaker says 
something incorrect or inconsistent with the representation that is in the listener’s 
attentional focus, the listener might find it challenging to recover the correct 
interpretation. Indeed, speakers in a conversation often produce under-informative or 
egocentric utterances with the expectation that a listener will provide feedback if a 
clarification is needed (Krauss & Weinheimer, 1966; Schober, 1993). It may be more 
efficient from the listener’s standpoint to distribute attention more broadly to multiple 
representations and allow many candidate interpretations to remain partially activated 
throughout the producer’s utterance. This may be particularly true in live conversation—
which we elicited here—as compared to the comprehension of pre-recorded or scripted 
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lab stimuli. In a real conversation, listeners may infer that their partners can make 
mistakes when speaking. For example, listeners might accumulate direct evidence that a 
certain speaker is not always accurate (e.g., because the speaker is not adept at 
perspective-taking or simply didn’t pay close enough attention to the visual display), or 
they themselves might be error-prone speakers and attribute similar qualities to their 
partner, among many other options. I directly examine this in the re-analysis presented in 
Experiment 2. 
This view of comprehension is consistent with a wealth of findings that, as the 
interpretive process unfolds, many candidate interpretations remain active, from the level 
of the phonemes (Allopenna, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 1998; Dahan, Magnuson, & 
Tanenhaus, 2001) to semantics (Yee & Sedivy, 2006; Yee, Overton, & Thompson-Schill, 
2009). These candidate representations even remain active (though to a lesser degree) 
once they should have been ruled out by prior information (e.g., Allopenna, et al., 1998; 
Nozari, Trueswell, & Thompson-Schill, 2014; Levy, Bicknell, Slattery, & Rayner, 2009), 
potentially as a mechanism to facilitate re-analysis if the dominant interpretation turns out 
to be incorrect.  
 
Experiment 2 
Perspective-taking often takes place in an interactive setting (e.g., a conversation) 
and may be affected in real time by the course of the interaction. For example, listeners 
may learn not to trust a speaker who repeatedly fails to take their perspective into 
account. Yet, nothing is known about how people adjust during a conversation, nor what 
individual differences might subserve effective adjustment. In Experiment 1, measures of 
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individual differences in memory and inhibition were not related to individual differences 
in comprehension. Despite these low correlations, participants were generally successful 
at perspective-taking in comprehension, production, and cue generation, suggesting that 
the particular individual differences we examined may not have been the critical ones. 
It may be that use of perspective is guided not only by one’s simulation of the 
conversation partner’s current beliefs, but also by how consistently the conversation 
partner has produced appropriate utterances over the history of the discourse. Thus, a 
listener’s eye movements might differ depending on whether the speaker has previously 
made errors while providing instructions. Similarly, a speaker may choose to be over-
informative if their conversation partner frequently asks for clarification. Analyses that 
aggregate data over the entire conversation and ignore the unfolding relationship between 
the two conversation partners may obscure evidence of successful adaptation to the 
unique perspective-taking demands of the conversational dyad. Furthermore, the ability 
to dynamically adapt to the particular features of an interlocutor may rely on the ability to 
recognize and track the partner’s perspective-taking errors, and may engage the very 
working memory and learning mechanisms we hoped to isolate in Experiment 1. The 
goal of the re-analysis is to explore the dynamic evolution of perspective-taking over the 
course of a conversation, and how these changes are affected by individual differences in 
memory.  
Methods 
Data from Experiment 1 were restructured so as to model the dyadic nature of the 
data and answer specific questions: 
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1. Do listeners tune their perspective-taking behavior to a speaker’s reliability in their use 
of perspective?  
2. Is the amount of adaptation tied to individual differences in memory and executive 
function?  
In order to answer the first question, I examined how comprehension performance in 
the Two Contrasts-Privileged condition (see Figure 3, above) depends on the nature of 
previous productions9 by that person’s partner using an Overtime Actor-Partner 
Interdependence model (Kashy & Kenny, 1999) as illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Over-time Actor-Partner Interdependence Model of perspective-taking in 
comprehension. PT= perspective-taking. Time t = current trial. E = error.  
 
A second analysis intended to address the first question will involve categorizing 
individual trial data based on which quarter of the experiment they occurred in. Time 
(approximated by the quarters of the experiment) and the partner’s individual 
perspective-taking (during production) score will be entered as factors in a hierarchical 
model predicting comprehension performance in the Two Contrasts-Privileged condition.  
																																																								
9 “Previous production trial” here refers to the previous critical trial (not including fillers) for which the 
partner was in the speaker role. Multiple filler trials and trials in which the actor was in the speaker role 
could have intervened between the previous production trial and the current production trial. 
!
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To answer the second question, I included both the Actor’s working memory scores 
and inhibitory control scores in the APIM analysis as a covariate and included 
interactions between time and working memory and inhibitory control in the growth 
curve model described above. 
Predictions 
If participants do adjust their perspective-taking behavior in response to the 
perspective-taking errors that their conversation partners make, I expected to find 
significant effects of the partner’s production accuracy during preceding critical trials (t-
1) on perspective-taking during comprehension (at time t), as well as a significant effect 
of the actor’s own production accuracy at t-1. I also predict that there will be a significant 
interaction between the linear effect of time on perspective-taking during comprehension 
and the partner’s production accuracy, such that the effect of time will be positive when 
the partner produces mostly accurate instructions and negative when the partner makes 
many errors. Finally, if the role of executive function was previously masked by the 
dynamic perspective-taking adjustments within the conversational dyads, there should be 
significant effects of the listener’s working memory and inhibition when the adjustments 
over time are controlled for (in both the APIM and the growth curve model). 
Results 
1. Do listeners tune their perspective-taking behavior to a speaker’s reliability?  
 As in Experiment 1, the dependent variable indexing perspective-taking during 
comprehension was binary fixations to the target during the previously specified time-
region of analysis. To simplify the analyses, only data from the Two Contrasts-Privileged 
condition was included. This is the critical condition in which the listener can resolve a 
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temporary ambiguity earlier in time if they take into account the speaker’s perspective. 
The independent variables of interest are the most recent production accuracy of the actor 
and partner, as well as the time spent in the experiment (approximated by quarters). In 
this subset of the data, the error rate on the preceding trial was 17% for actors and 18% 
for partners; the preceding trials included all three production conditions (Contrast-
Shared, Contrast-privileged, and No Contrast). Figures 7 and 8 summarize the effects of 
the partner’s and the actor’s previous production accuracy on the actor’s perspective-
taking in comprehension and the effect of the partner’s production accuracy over time on 
the actor’s perspective-taking in comprehension, respectively.  
 
Figure 7. Average proportion of target fixations during comprehension in the Two-
Contrasts Privileged condition by the actor’s and partner’s performance on their most 
recent production trial. 
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Figure 8. Perspective-taking in comprehension as a function of trial position in the 
experiment and partner’s preceding production accuracy. 
 
I first fit a generalized linear multi-level model, which included main effects of a 
binary measure of the partner’s production accuracy on the previous trial and a binary 
measure of the actor’s (i.e., listener’s) production accuracy on the previous production 
trial, along with their interaction, in the fixed effects structure (Table 7). The random 
effects structure consisted of random intercepts for each pair crossed with random 
intercepts for items.  Participants’ likelihood of fixating the target was not significantly 
related to their partner’s prior production accuracy or their own prior production 
accuracy, nor the interaction of the two. The lack of an effect of the actor’s own 
preceding production accuracy is consistent with the finding, in Experiment 1, that 
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participants’ perspective-taking performance during comprehension was not correlated 
with their perspective-taking performance during production. 
Fixed effects: 
 Estimate Std. Error z-value p-value 
(Intercept) 1.49 0.12 12.18 <2e-16 
Partner’s production accuracy on 
previous trial 0.06 0.16 0.36 0.72 
Actor’s production accuracy on 
previous trial 0.06 0.23 0.24 0.81 
Partner’s production accuracy on 
previous trial x Actor’s production 
accuracy on previous trial 0.46 0.46 1.00 0.32 
 
Random effects: 
 Groups  Variance Std. Dev. 
 Items (Intercept) 0.56 0.75 
 Pair (Intercept) 0.15 0.39 
Number of observations: 2084, Items: 96, Pairs: 76 
Table 7. Actor-Partner Interdependence Model of the relationship between Perspective-
taking during Comprehension and during Production. 
 
In a second analysis, I examined the linear change over time of the relationship 
between the actor’s perspective-taking during comprehension and the partner’s 
production accuracy. I fit a generalized linear multi-level model, which included the main 
effects of the partner’s production accuracy on the previous trial and which quarter of the 
experiment the current trial was in, along with their interaction, in the fixed effects 
structure (Table 8). The random effects structure consisted of random intercepts for each 
pair crossed with random intercepts for items.  Participants’ likelihood of fixating the 
target was not found to be related to their partner’s prior production accuracy and the 
relationship between these variables did not change significantly over the course of the 
experiment.   
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Fixed effects: 
 Estimate Std. Error z-value p-value 
(Intercept) 1.46 0.11 13.44 <2e-16 
Quarters of the experiment 0.02 0.06 0.42 0.67 
Partner’s production accuracy on 
previous trial 0.07 0.16 0.42 0.68 
Quarters of the experiment x 
Partner’s production accuracy on 
previous trial -0.25 0.15 -1.60 0.11 
 
Random effects: 
 Groups  Variance Std. Dev. 
 Items (Intercept) 0.56 0.75 
 Pair (Intercept) 0.15 0.38 
Number of observations: 2096, Items: 96, Pairs: 76 
Table 8. Analysis of the relationship between Perspective-taking during Comprehension 
and the partner’s production accuracy over time (quarters of the experiment). 
 
 
2. Is the amount of adaptation tied to individual differences in memory and executive 
function?  
 In order to test whether the relationship between the listener’s perspective-taking 
and the partner’s production accuracy (or lack thereof) was modulated by individual 
differences, the two previous models (Table 7 and 8) were refit with additional 
covariates: Operation Span, Minus Two Span, Stroop One and Stroop Two. Due to their 
complexity, models with random effects did not converge so logistic regression analyses 
were used instead. The model estimates are summarized in Tables 17 and 18 in the 
Appendix. Due to the large number of comparisons contained in these two analyses, I 
used a Bonferroni-corrected alpha level (0.05/2=0.025) to determine significance. The 
four measures of executive function did not significantly predict target fixations, nor did 
they interact with the actor’s previous production accuracy, the partner’s previous 
production accuracy or quarters of the experiment. Consistent with the results of 
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Experiment 1, these results do not provide evidence for a relationship between 
perspective-taking during comprehension and executive function. 
Discussion 
Consistent with the conclusions from Experiment 1, participants’ perspective-
taking during comprehension was not related to their production performance or to 
individual differences in working memory or inhibitory control. Additionally, the re-
analysis of the data from Experiment 1 did not provide compelling evidence that listeners 
are able to tune their use of perspective-taking during comprehension in response to the 
speaker’s perspective-taking performance. Listener’s perspective-taking performance did 
not seem to depend on whether their partner had previously provided an incorrect 
instruction, nor did it change systematically over the course of the experiment. This result 
lends support to the idea that when perspective-taking is used in different domains (e.g., 
comprehension vs. production) it may call upon different lower-level cognitive functions 
which account for more of the variance in performance than cognitive functions that are 
shared between the domains. 
One major challenge for interpreting these results comes from the fact that 
incorrect productions were much less frequent than correct productions. Further analyses 
or an experimental manipulation of the accuracy of the partner’s productions will be 
necessary to definitively determine whether listeners can adapt their on-line language 
comprehension to their partner’s accuracy during production, over the course of a dialog. 
Nonetheless, these results speak to the role of, and constraints on, adaptation in language 
processing (cf. Kleinschmidt & Jaeger, 2015). If listeners can adapt their use of 
perspective-taking in comprehension, it may require the accumulation of a large amount 
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of evidence that the speaker is not reliable (i.e., one previous trial may not be enough to 
elicit a change in perspective-taking).  
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CHAPTER 3: SPEAKER-SPECIFIC SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE-TAKING 
 
In the following experiments, which are reported in Ryskin, Wang, and Brown-
Schmidt (2016), I examine whether listeners can encode partner-specific representations 
of spatial perspectives and use them to interpret spatial language on-line. I test this in a 
spatial perspective-taking paradigm where listeners hear instructions to move items onto 
a target location, and critically, those instructions alternate between two spatial 
perspectives.  In one case, each spatial perspective is uniquely tied to a different 
individual talker. This is analogous to when you are sitting at a table and listening to two 
people on either side of you—their viewpoints remain consistent throughout the 
conversation (see Figure 2). In the other case, participants switch between two 
perspectives that are tied to one individual—imagine you are sitting at a table and one 
person is moving from one side to another while holding the conversation.  If listeners do 
use speaker identity as a cue to their representation of a speaker’s spatial perspective, the 
case in which there is a one-to-one mapping between speakers and perspectives should 
facilitate perspective-taking for the listener. The one-to-one mapping would support 
distinct representations of each spatial perspective, making them easier to access from 
memory to guide the process of on-line comprehension of spatial language. On the other 
hand, if spatial perspectives are not stored partner-specifically, the speaker’s voice should 
not be a helpful cue to accessing the relevant spatial perspective, and as a result, there 
should be no processing benefit in the two-speaker case.  
In Experiment 3, I also examine the effect of angular disparity (the distance in 
degrees between two perspectives) on online comprehension of the spatial term. I predict 
that, if participants make use of the unique speaker-perspective mappings, the mappings 
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may be particularly helpful in situations where the angular disparity is greatest. When the 
angular disparity is small, the advantage provided by storing perspectives partner-
specifically and accessing them online compared to simply applying the mental rotation 
de novo may be minimal. 
 
Experiment 3 
Method 
 Participants. Forty-nine undergraduate students at the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign participated in this experiment in exchange for partial course credit. 
Participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and spoke English fluently. 
 Materials. Participants completed a spatial perspective-taking task on a desktop 
computer while their eye-movements were monitored using an Eyelink-1000 desktop-
mounted eye-tracker at 1000hz. Stimulus presentation was controlled using Matlab’s 
Psychophysics Toolbox 3 (PTB-3, Brainard, 1997). On each trial, participants saw a 
display with a variety of circles and triangles10 (Figure 9) and listened to pre-recorded 
instructions about which object to move around the screen. They were instructed to 
imagine that the display was actually laid out on a table in front of them and that they and 
the person giving them the instructions was looking at this table as well. Participants 
were also told that there might be one person speaking or two people alternating giving 
instructions.  
																																																								
10 These shapes were chosen because they do not have an intrinsic up, down, left, or right.  
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Figure 9. Example array seen by participants and the correct action they should execute 
after hearing the instruction “Move the circle with the green crosses to the right onto the 
circle with the purple dots.” The beige-colored “tabletop” converges towards the top of 
the computer display to give the appearance of depth. 
 
At the start of each trial, an arrow appeared in one of the four corners of the 
screen. This arrow indicated which viewpoint the audio instruction would be given from. 
Relative to the listener’s viewpoint, the arrow could be at an angle of 45°, 135°, 225° (as 
in Figure 9), or 315°. The audio instruction began playing at the same time as the display, 
including the arrow, appeared. Instructions were of the following form: “Move the 
[shape] with the [color][pattern] to the [DIRECTION TERM] onto the [shape] with the 
[color][pattern]” 11. For example, a participant might hear “Move the circle with the 
green crosses to the right onto the circle with the purple dots.”  The destination of the 
instruction--in the preceding example, the circle with the purple dots--was coded as the 
“target” object.  
The displays and audio instructions were designed such that unless the listener 
correctly interpreted the direction term, the instruction was temporarily ambiguous 																																																								
11 Shapes: circle or triangle; colors: blue, green, red, orange, purple, or yellow; patterns: dots, crosses, 
stars, or lines; direction terms: left, right, forward, backward. 
correct action 
target 
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between multiple potential objects. On all trials, this potential ambiguity was lexically 
resolved at the final word in the instruction, e.g., purple dots. The temporary ambiguity 
was created by placing a competitor of the same shape and color in the opposite direction 
of the target. For example, in Figure 9, a circle with purple lines is placed to the left of 
the circle with the green crosses (from the perspective indicated by the arrow). Thus if a 
listener did not correctly interpret the spatial term (left), the instruction would be 
ambiguous until the final word “dots”. The onsets of the direction term (left), the target 
shape word (circle [with the purple dots]), and the target pattern (dots) were identified by 
hand using Praat software (Boersma & Weenink, 2012), which allowed eye-movement 
analyses to be time-locked to the audio instructions. 
 Participants saw each specific array of objects (e.g., the layout in Figure 9) for 8 
trials in a row. After completing the instruction on each trial, the dragged object popped 
back into its original position for the beginning of the next trial. After 8 trials, the array of 
objects changed. The layout of the objects in each array was random except for two 
constraints: (1) Only one exemplar of each object type (e.g., circle with green crosses) 
appeared in a given array.  (2) Each array contained eight target-competitor pairs (e.g., 
two circles with a purple pattern separated by one to-be-dragged shape with a different 
color) allowing for eight trials in a row to occur without changing the overall display. 
Participants completed two blocks of trials. Each block contained 11 unique arrays, each 
of which contained 8 trials, for a total of 176 trials (88 trials per block) per participant.  
 Experimental design. Within each test block, participants followed instructions 
from one of two spatial perspectives. The critical manipulation in this study was whether 
those spatial perspectives were yoked to a single talker or to different talkers. Thus, 
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between blocks we manipulated whether participants always heard one speaker (One 
Speaker condition) giving instructions from each perspective (i.e., the same voice gave 
instructions regardless of where the arrow was), or two speakers (Two Speaker condition) 
gave instructions and each speaker was associated with a particular perspective (e.g., one 
voice gave instructions when the arrow was at 135° and the other voice gave instructions 
when the arrow was at 225°). Participants were informed before the start of each block if 
they would be hearing one voice or two.  
In order to create the two conditions, instructions from three different speakers 
were recorded—two female voices (A and B) and one male voice (C). In the One Speaker 
condition participants heard either voice A or B, and in the Two Speaker condition 
participants heard B and C, or A and C. The male – female voice contrast in the Two 
Speaker condition was used so that participants had no doubts that there were two 
different voices. The speaker manipulation was within-subjects, and each participant 
heard all three different voices over the course of the experiment (for a given subject a 
particular voice was heard in only one of the conditions). 
Finally, in order to reduce interference across blocks and examine angular 
disparity effects, in one test block the instructions were given from the two top angles 
(135° and 225°), and in the other block, instructions were given from the two bottom 
angles (45° and 315°). Two versions of each array were created so that each array (and 
trial) appeared both in the Top Angles condition and the Bottom Angles condition 
between subjects. This was done by rotating each array by 180° and keeping the auditory 
stimulus exactly the same. Number of Speakers and Angle pair were fully crossed with 
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the version of the array, and the order of conditions and voices was counterbalanced, 
resulting in sixteen experimental lists (Appendix Table 19).  
Within a test-block, instructions alternated between the two angles pseudo-
randomly. Based on previous findings that switching between spatial viewpoints poses 
challenges (Ryskin, et al., 2014), for each test trial, we coded whether the previous trial 
was given from the same perspective (No Switch, e.g., 135° then 135°), or from the 
alternative perspective (Switch, e.g., 135° then 225°). Block order (one speaker vs. two 
speaker; top angles vs. bottom angles) was counterbalanced across participants. Each 
participant was tested on a single list. 
Analysis and Results 
 The dependent measure used to index spatial perspective-taking was the eye-
movements that participants made as they interpreted the potentially ambiguous 
instruction (e.g., Move the circle with the green crosses to the right onto the circle with 
the purple dots). Eye movements associated with the interpretation of spatial perspective 
were analyzed in terms of a binary measure: whether the participant fixated the target 
during the specified time window or not12. A fixation was coded as a target-fixation if the 
x,y fixation-coordinates landed on the target object (e.g., the circle with the purple dots), 
or on a small portion of the white space surrounding it (this buffer space did not overlap 
with any other object). See Appendix Figures 25, 26, 29 for summary figures describing 
fixations to the other objects on the screen. 
																																																								
12 Note that eye-gaze analyses in language tasks sometimes use a proportion measure (proportion of target fixations on 
each trial in a specified time-window). We used a different approach because inspection of the proportion-based 
measure revealed that the data distribution was highly zero-inflated and would violate the linear model assumption of 
normally distributed residuals. 
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 In order to examine both early and late processing effects, target fixations were 
measured in three consecutive time windows. The first time window (average duration 
1550 milliseconds) began at the onset of the direction term (e.g., right) and ended at the 
onset of the target shape (e.g., circle). The second time window (average duration 1700 
milliseconds) began at the onset of the target shape term and ended at the onset of the 
pattern term (e.g., dots). The third time window began at the onset of the pattern term and 
ended 1500 milliseconds after the onset of the pattern term.  The first two windows 
captured interpretation of the potentially ambiguous portion of the critical instruction, 
with the first window focusing on interpretation of the spatial term, and the second 
focusing on the ambiguous noun. The third time window captures any processing that 
may occur post-lexical disambiguation. The time windows were all offset by 200 
milliseconds due to the time needed to program and launch an eye movement (Hallett, 
1986). The proportion of trials with a target fixation in each time-window are plotted by 
Speaker condition (1 Speaker vs. 2 Speakers), as well as Angle pair (Top angles vs. 
Bottom angles), and Switching condition (no Switch vs. Switch) in Figures 10 through 
12. 
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Figure 10. Proportion of trials with target fixations in the first time window (e.g., right 
onto the). Error bars represent standard error of the mean, calculated using the method 
from Morey (2008). 
 
 
Figure 11. Proportion of trials with target fixations in the second time window (e.g., the 
circle with the purple). Error bars represent standard error of the mean, calculated using 
the method from Morey (2008). 
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Figure 12.  Proportion of trials with target fixations in the third time window (e.g., dots 
+1500ms). Error bars represent standard error of the mean, calculated using the method 
from Morey (2008). 
 
 For each time window, the proportion of trials with a target fixation were 
analyzed in a multilevel logistic regression, using the lme4 software package in R (Bates, 
Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). Speaker, Angle pair, and Switching, along with their 
three-way interaction and all two-way interactions, were entered as fixed effects (Table 
9) with subjects and trials as random effects. All fixed effects were coded with mean-
centered contrast codes. When the maximal random effects structure justified by the 
design did not converge, random slopes with the least variance were removed until the 
model converged (see Appendix Table 21). Model comparison was used to assess the 
significance of effects. 
 In the first time window (Move the circle with the green crosses to the right onto 
the circle with the purple dots), there was a main effect of Angle pair, such that 
participants made fewer target fixations in the Top Angles condition. A significant 
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interaction of Angle pair and Switching was due to a significant Switching effect in the 
Top Angles condition (β= -0.29 , p< 0.005), but no effect of Switching in the Bottom 
Angles condition (β= 0.10, p= 0.33 ). In the Top Angles condition, participants made 
fewer fixations to the target when the previous trial had been in a different perspective.  
In the second time window (Move the circle with the green crosses to the right 
onto the circle with the purple dots), there was a main effect of Speaker such that 
participants in the Two Speaker condition made more fixations to the target than 
participants in the One Speaker condition. Participants also made fewer target fixations 
when they had to switch perspectives.  
In the third time window (Move the circle with the green crosses to the right onto 
the circle with the purple dots +1500ms), participants made fewer target fixations when 
they had to switch perspectives. This Switching effect was primarily driven by the Two 
Speaker condition (β= -0.31, p< 0.001). There was no significant effect of switching in 
the One Speaker condition (β= -0.05, p=0.60) 
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Fixed Effects β SE z-value p-value 
     
First Time Window     
(Intercept) -0.464 0.170 -2.725 0.006 
Speaker 0.165 0.159 1.039 0.297 
Angle pair -0.330 0.162 -2.033 0.046 * 
Switching -0.093 0.083 -1.115 0.300 
Speaker x Angle pair 0.471 0.668 0.705 0.481 
Speaker x Switching 0.013 0.104 0.124 0.897 
Angle pair x Switching -0.402 0.125 -3.229 1.63e-4 * 
Speaker x Angle pair x Switching 0.048 0.208 0.231 0.819 
     
Second Time Window     
(Intercept) 0.994 0.161 6.163 7.13e-10 
Speaker 0.304 0.139 2.191 0.032 * 
Angle pair -0.215 0.139 -1.546 0.129 
Switching -0.178 0.082 -2.182 0.036 * 
Speaker x Angle pair 0.497 0.637 0.781 0.431 
Speaker x Switching -0.050 0.107 -0.473 0.639 
Angle pair x Switching -0.062 0.107 -0.579 0.565 
Speaker x Angle pair x Switching 0.253 0.253 1.000 0.325 
     
Third Time Window     
(Intercept) 1.619 0.121 13.333 <2e-16 
Speaker 0.008 0.059 0.129 0.898 
Angle pair -0.072 0.059 -1.224 0.225 
Switching -0.170 0.076 -2.230 0.027 * 
Speaker x Angle pair 0.519 0.475 1.092 0.278 
Speaker x Switching -0.237 0.118 -2.014 0.046 * 
Angle pair x Switching -0.068 0.118 -0.572 0.570 
Speaker x Angle pair x Switching 0.297 0.236 1.259 0.212 
Table 9. Experiment 3: Results of the logistic mixed-effects model of target fixations 
across three time windows 
 
Discussion 
 I hypothesized that listeners could encode spatial perspectives and bind those 
representations in memory to a particular speaker. If so, I predicted that listeners should 
then use speaker identity as a cue to efficiently access these stored perspective 
representations during language processing. Consistent with this hypothesis, I found that 
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on-line interpretation was facilitated when each perspective was mapped to a particular 
speaker, compared to when two perspectives were mapped to the same speaker. In 
addition, this experiment replicated previous findings of a cost associated with switching 
between spatial perspectives (Ryskin et al., 2014). The fact that switching between spatial 
perspectives incurs costs is generally consistent with the broader conclusion that listeners 
maintained stored representations of spatial perspective and used these stored 
perspectives to guide online processing.  
It is also worth noting that the effects of Switching and Speaker seem to be driven 
primarily by the Top angles. Despite the fact that the means are suggestive of a Speaker 
by Angle Pair interaction (see Figures 10-12), the statistical analyses13 do not lend 
support to our prediction that the benefits of speaker-to-perspective binding would be 
larger in the Top angles. On the other hand, Angle Pair does interact significantly with 
Switching such that the Switching effect is absent for the Bottom angles. This may be the 
result of a ceiling effect for the Bottom angles, consistent with previous findings of 
greater ease of perspective-taking when the angular disparity is small (e.g., Kessler & 
Thomson, 2010). However, given that the targets in the Bottom angle conditions are 
closer to the egocentric competitors (i.e., the cells most consistent with an egocentric 
interpretation of the direction term), it is difficult to rule out the possibility that this 
ceiling effect might be due to partial overlap between the speaker perspective and the 
egocentric perspective (e.g., “right” from 45° is “right and down” from 0° vs. “right” 
from 135° is “left and down” from 0°). As a result, in Experiment 4, I only test the Top 
angles (135° and 225°). 
																																																								
13 Note the large variability for the Speaker x Angle Pair interaction in Table 7 and Table 21. 
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Finally, while the results of Experiment 3 provide evidence that listeners can use 
remembered spatial perspectives to guide online language processing, there exists an 
alternate explanation of the critical two-speaker advantage. Recall that the arrow cue 
appeared on-screen at the same time as the spoken instruction. As a result, in the One 
Speaker condition, participants needed to locate the arrow first, in order to interpret the 
instruction. By contrast, participants in the Two Speaker condition could simply use the 
voice cue. On this interpretation, participants did remember which spatial perspective is 
associated with each talker in the Two Speaker condition, but this association only served 
the same function as the arrow cues with no spatial representations attached.  The 
difference between One and Two Speakers is caused by the need to fixate the arrow in 
the One Speaker condition to know which perspective to take, which led to a downstream 
delay in processing the sentence online and locating the target.  
While participants did not spend a lot of time looking at the arrows while they 
listened to the instruction (Appendix Figures 25 and 26), the design of the experiment 
was such that recording of the eye movements began at the same time as the onset of the 
audio instructions. This did not allow us to capture eye-movements following the 
appearance of the new display and before the onset of the audio. It could be that 
participants gazed at the arrow following scene onset more in the One Speaker condition, 
limiting inspection of the scene. This could have led to the downstream comprehension 
slow-down for participants in the One Speaker condition. To address this possibility, 
Experiment 4 was designed as a replication of Experiment 3, but it included a delay 
between the presentation of the arrow (and beginning of eye-movement recording) and 
the onset of the auditory stimulus. This delay would allow participants in both Speaker 
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conditions enough time to look at the arrow before any sentence comprehension 
processes need to be engaged.  
Experiment 4 
The aim of Experiment 4 was to replicate the two-speaker advantage observed in 
Experiment 3, while allowing plenty of time for participants to encode the spatial 
perspective cue prior to interpretation of the critical instruction.  
Method 
 Participants. Forty-eight undergraduate students at the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign participated in this experiment in exchange for partial course credit. 
Participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and spoke English fluently. 
 Materials and design. The design of this experiment was identical to Experiment 
3 except that the Angle Pair factor was removed. Only the top angles (135°, 225°) were 
used. As a result, the number of experimental lists was reduced to eight (Appendix Table 
20). Critically, a delay of 1500 milliseconds was introduced between the appearance on 
the screen of the display with the arrow and the onset of the auditory stimulus for every 
trial.  
Analysis and Results 
As in the third experiment, the dependent measure was the eye-movements that 
participants made as they interpreted the potentially ambiguous instruction. Target 
fixations were analyzed during the same three time windows used in Experiment 3 
(region 1: direction term; region 2: target shape; region 3: pattern term). The average 
proportions of trials with a target fixation in each of the three time windows is plotted by 
Speaker (1 Speaker vs. 2 Speakers) and Switching condition (no Switch vs. Switch) in 
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Figures 13 through 15. Plots of fixations to other objects on the screen are presented in 
the Appendix Figures 27, 28, and 30. 
 
Figure 13. Proportion of trials with target fixations in the first time window (e.g., right 
onto the). Error bars represent standard error of the mean, calculated using the method 
from Morey (2008). 
 
Figure 14. Proportion of trials with target fixations in the second time window (e.g., the 
circle with the purple). Error bars represent standard error of the mean, calculated using 
the method from Morey (2008). 
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Figure 15. Proportion of trials with target fixations in the third time window (e.g., dots 
+1500ms). Error bars represent standard error of the mean, calculated using the method 
from Morey (2008). 
 
 For each time window, the proportion of trials with a target fixation was analyzed 
in a multilevel logistic regression as before. Speaker, Switching, and their interaction 
were entered as fixed effects coded with mean-centered contrast codes (Table 10). 
Random intercepts were entered for subjects and trials, with random by-subjects slopes 
for Speaker, Switching, and their interaction, and by-trials slopes for Speaker condition 
(Appendix Table 22). Model comparison was used to assess the significance of effects. 
 In the first time window (Move the circle with the green crosses to the right onto 
the circle with the purple dots), there was a marginal effect of Switching, such that 
participants were less likely to fixate the target when they had just switched perspectives.  
In the second time window (Move the circle with the green crosses to the right 
onto the circle with the purple dots), there was a main effect of Speaker such that 
participants in the Two Speaker condition made more fixations to the target than 
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participants in the One Speaker condition. There was also marginal effect of Switching 
such that participants were less likely to fixate the target after switching.  
There were no significant effects in the third time window (Move the circle with 
the green crosses to the right onto the circle with the purple dots +1500ms); target 
fixations were uniformly high following the interpretation of the disambiguating pattern 
word. 
Fixed Effects β SE z-value p-value 
     
First Time Window     
(Intercept) -0.694 0.204 -3.408 0.001 
Speaker -0.038 0.176 -0.218 0.827 
Switching -0.184 0.095 -1.927 0.058† 
Speaker x Switching -0.181 0.117 -1.550 0.125 
     
Second Time Window     
(Intercept) 0.721 0.198 3.639 0.000 
Speaker 0.314 0.150 2.092 0.042* 
Switching -0.163 0.093 -1.755 0.084† 
Speaker x Switching 0.060 0.135 0.444 0.660 
     
Third Time Window     
(Intercept) 1.542 0.170 9.063 <2e-16 
Speaker 0.125 0.119 1.057 0.300 
Switching -0.089 0.086 -1.031 0.309 
Speaker x Switching 0.086 0.137 0.627 0.536 
Table 10. Experiment 4: Results of the logistic mixed-effects model of target fixations 
across three time windows (see Appendix Table 22 for random effects).  
 
Discussion 
 The results of Experiment 4 largely replicate the key findings of Experiment 3. 
Even with the added delay between the visual and auditory stimuli, perspective-taking 
was facilitated when each perspective was mapped to a distinct speaker, compared to 
when two perspectives are mapped to the same speaker. This finding suggests that 
listeners’ representations of perspective can be tied to the individual speaker and that 
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encoding representations in this way makes accessing them on-line more efficient. 
Experiment 4 also replicates the effect of switching such that switching from one 
perspective to another is accompanied by an additional cost to processing perspective –
laden language.  
Discussion 
 Taking into account the spatial perspective of an interlocutor is an essential skill 
necessary for successful communication. In Experiments 3 and 4, I examined how this 
process unfolds in real time. I hypothesized that listeners would store a representation of 
each speaker’s perspective bound to the identity of that speaker. This partner-specific 
encoding would allow listeners to flexibly retrieve the appropriate representations and 
use spatial perspective information to constrain their interpretation during online 
processing of a sentence. 
Across two eye-tracking experiments, I find support for my hypotheses. 
Participants in a spatial perspective-taking task make more predictive target fixations 
when each perspective is associated with a specific speaker than when one speaker 
alternates between two perspectives. I conclude from this that representations of a 
speaker’s spatial perspective on a visual array can be bound to the speaker’s identity in 
memory and that listeners access these partner-specific representations online during 
comprehension.  
Moreover, in these studies, participants could have completely ignored the fact 
that there were different voices and still completed the task successfully, because the 
arrows provide all the necessary perspective information to interpret each instruction. The 
fact that participants did not ignore the voice information suggests that encoding of new 
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speaker-specific representations occurs spontaneously, as a dialog unfolds. Though I 
certainly do not claim that storing such spatial perspective representations is something 
that listeners always do in conversation (the data cannot speak to that), it seems plausible 
that they would be all the more inclined to do so outside the laboratory setting, where 
cues to spatial perspective differences are more salient and sentences are not always 
eventually disambiguated. Indeed, Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley 
Scott (2010) show that listeners compute an agent’s perspective spontaneously, even 
when it is irrelevant to the task at hand. Our data suggest that, when the agent’s 
perspective is stable, listeners take advantage of being able to ease the computational 
burden by tying the perspective to the agent in memory. An interesting avenue for future 
research might be to identify the constraints that modulate when listeners do or do not 
store spatial perspective information speaker-specifically. 
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CHAPTER 4:  CONTEXT-SPECIFIC LEARNING OF PRAGMATICS 
 
During language comprehension, people integrate contextually constrained 
pragmatic information to resolve temporary referential ambiguity (e.g., Sedivy, et al. 
1999; Ito & Speer, 2008). Speakers, however, vary in their pragmatic ability, being more 
or less reliable in detecting and encoding contextual contrast (Sedivy, 2003). Recent 
studies have proposed that such pragmatic variability in language use demands an 
adaptive mechanism by which comprehenders suppress contrastive inferences in response 
to explicit (Grodner & Sedivy, 2011) and implicit (Kurumada et al., 2014) violation of 
pragmatic expectations.  
In Experiments 5 and 6, I test whether participants can cancel their usual 
pragmatic inferences (i.e., “small” must refer to an object in a size contrast pair) when 
provided with evidence that such pragmatic cues are used infelicitously in the given 
context. Additionally, Experiments 5a and 5b explore the nature of what the listeners 
learns—is it that scalar cues are used incorrectly or that this speaker is generally 
infelicitous?—by looking for transfer from one pragmatic domain to another. I also 
explore what features of infelicitous cues are necessary for learning. Pogue et al., (2016) 
find evidence for generalization in situations of under-informativity but not over-
informativity. In Experiment 5a, the infelicitous speaker uses over-informative scalar 
adjectives that are not entirely infelicitous given that there are shapes of varying sizes 
present in the larger visual context. In Experiment 5b, infelicity is elicited by more salient 
over-informative expressions (e.g., the use of “small”, when only big shapes are present 
in the display). Experiment 6 provides a more powerful test of pragmatic adaptation by 
placing the exposure and test trials in the same context. 
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Experiment 5a  
 The aim of Experiment 5a is to test whether listeners adapt their pragmatic 
inferences based on bottom-up exposure and whether adaptation to the pragmatic 
competence of a speaker will transfer from one pragmatic domain to another. I test this 
by examining eye fixations during the interpretation of scalar adjectives after exposure to 
felicitous or infelicitous speakers using either prosodic or scalar cues to contrast. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 80 students from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign were 
given partial course credit to participate in the experiment. All participants were fluent 
speakers of American English with normal or corrected-to-normal vision and normal 
hearing.  
Procedure 
 Participants first completed a brief training task in which they see four shapes on 
the computer screen, and hear an instruction to click on one of them. There were two 
instructions per set of four shapes (e.g., “Show me the red dotted triangle, Now show me 
the blue triangle.”). Participants were told to execute the action by clicking on the shape. 
They were told to imagine that “little Joe” and his mom are playing a game on her 
computer and their job is to listen to her speech and click on the pictures that she is 
talking about.  This was followed by the transfer task during which participants heard 
audio instructions such as, “Click on the small dog.” and selected one of the four pictures 
available in the display. They were informed that these sentences were recorded by the 
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same speaker as the sentences in the first part. During the transfer task, their eye 
movements were tracked using an EyeLink-1000 desktop mounted eye-tracker. The 
experimental session lasted about 20 minutes. 
Materials 
 The training task consisted of 12 trials in which participants saw a 2 x 2 grid of 
shapes (squares, triangles, or circles) with different combinations of colors (red, blue, or 
yellow), sizes (big or small), and patterns (checkers, dots, or stripes). Each training trial 
consisted of a grid with four shapes and a set of two paired instructions such as “Find me 
the circle. Now, find me the large blue triangle.” There were four different carrier 
phrases: “Show me the X”, “Point to the X”, “Find me the X”, and “Where’s the X.” the 
order of the training trials was randomized for each participant. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of four training conditions: Felicitous-Prosody, Infelicitous-
Prosody, Felicitous-Scalars, Infelicitous-Scalars. Training condition was manipulated 
between-subjects. 
 Prosody training.  In the Felicitous- and Infelicitous-Prosody training conditions, 
all four objects in a given trial were the same size but varied in color, shape, and pattern. 
The same sets of 4 shapes were used across Felicitous and Infelicitous conditions and 
Reliability was manipulated through the prosody in the instructions (Figure 16). In the 
Felicitous-Prosody condition, six trials made felicitous use of prosody (in the form of an 
L+H* accent) to highlight a contrast on the adjective (e.g., “Point to the blue circle. Now, 
point to the YELLOW circle”) or the noun (e.g., “Where’s the striped circle? Now, 
where’s the striped SQUARE.”). Another six trials felicitously made no use of 
contrastive prosody because no contrasts were present (e.g., “Show me the checkered 
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square. Now, show me the dotted triangle.”). In the Infelicitous-Prosody condition, six 
trials contained an infelicitous L+H* on the wrong constituent (e.g., “Point to the blue 
square. Now, find me the yellow SQUARE” or “Where’s the striped circle? Now, 
where’s the STRIPED square.”). Three trials lacked an L+H* accent in the presence of a 
contrast (e.g., “Point to the blue circle. Now, point to the yellow circle.”) and three trials 
included an L+H* accent when nothing was contrasted (e.g., “Show me the checkered 
square. Now, show me the DOTTED triangle.”). 
 
Felicitous: “Point to the blue circle. Now, point to the YELLOW circle.” 
Infelicitous: “Point to the blue circle. Now, point to the yellow circle.” 
Figure 16. Experiment 5a: Example Prosody Training trial.  
 
 Scalar-training. In the Scalar training conditions, the four objects varied in shape, 
color, and size, but not pattern. On every trial, two of the shapes were big and two were 
small. Participants heard pairs of instructions, such as “Show me the circle. Now, show 
me the large yellow square.” The second instruction always contained a scalar adjective. 
Prosody was neutral across all the Scalar training sentences. In contrast to the Prosody 
training, for the Scalar training only one pair of instructions was recorded per display and 
Reliability was manipulated via the properties of the visual display (see Figure 17). In the 
Felicitous-Scalars condition, twelve trials contained felicitous use of scalar adjectives 
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(e.g., “Show me the blue triangle. Now, show me the small square.”) when a size contrast 
was present in the display (e.g., a small red square, a large red square, a large blue 
triangle, and a small yellow triangle). In the Infelicitous-Scalars training condition, six 
trials contained infelicitous scalar adjectives (e.g., “Show me the blue triangle. Now, 
show me the small square.”) which were over-informative given displays in which the 
target item was unique (e.g., a small red square, a large red circle, a large blue triangle, 
and a small yellow triangle). Another six training trials in the Infelicitous-Scalars 
condition contained infelicitous scalar adjectives (e.g., “Point to the triangle. Now, point 
to the small red circle.”). These trials were over-informative because the target shape was 
disambiguated by its color, and the scalar adjective did not contribute to identifying the 
target (e.g., a small red circle, a small blue circle, a large yellow triangle, and a small blue 
square).  
“Show me the blue triangle. Now, show me the small square.” 
 
Felicitous – Scalar training condition Infelicitous – Scalar training condition 
Figure 17. Experiment 6a: Example Scalar training conditions. 
 After completing one of the four training tasks, all participants completed the 
same transfer task (see Figure 18). The transfer task consisted of 50 trials in which 
participants saw a 2 x 2 grid of pictures of animals and common objects in conjunction 
with an auditory instruction about which item to click on. Ten trials were in the Contrast 
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condition in which the instruction contained a scalar adjective (e.g., “Click on the small 
dog.”) and the display contained a pair of size-contrasted items, one of which was the 
target item (e.g., a small dog and a large dog), and two distractors (e.g., a large piano and 
a small owl). Another ten trials comprised the No Contrast condition in which the 
auditory stimulus contained a scalar adjective (e.g., “Click on the small dog.”) and the 
display contained a large or small target object, a different object contrasting in size with 
the target, a large distractor, and a small distractor (e.g., a small dog, a large apple, a large 
piano, and a small owl).  
“Click on the small dog.” 
 
Contrast No Contrast 
Figure 18. Experiment 5a: Example transfer trials (Contrast vs. No Contrast condition) 
 Ten of the filler trials belonged to the Contrast control condition in which the 
instructions did not contain a scalar adjective (e.g., “Point to the dog.”). The display 
contained a large or small target object, a distractor object contrasting in size with the 
target, and a pair of size-contrasted distractor items (e.g., a small dog, a large flag, large 
scissors, small scissors). Ten of the filler trials were in the Other Contrast condition in 
which the instructions contain a non-scalar contrast (e.g., “Point to the leather jacket.”). 
The display contained a target object, a contrasting object, a large distractor, and a small 
distractor (e.g., a leather jacket, a rain jacket, a large hydrant, and a small dollar). The last 
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ten filler trials were the Other Contrast Control condition in which the instructions did not 
contain a contrast (e.g., “Point to the bike”). The display contained a target item, an item 
contrasting in size with the target, and a pair of contrasting items (e.g., a small bike, a 
large glass, a lead pencil, and a coloring pencil).  
 Two counterbalancing lists were created to allow target items (e.g., small dog) to 
appear both in the Contrast and No Contrast conditions across subjects. Target items were 
never repeated for a given subject, but they could reappear as distractor items. 
Participants were randomly assigned to a counterbalancing list. 
Results 
Interpretation of the scalar adjective was indexed by the proportion of eye-
movements that participants made to the target item as they interpreted the critical 
instructions, which consisted of a scalar adjective and a noun (e.g., Click on the small 
dog). A fixation was coded as a target-fixation if the x,y fixation-coordinates landed on 
the target object (e.g., the small dog), or on a small portion of the white space 
surrounding it (this buffer space did not overlap with any other object). Target fixations 
were measured in a time window (average duration 726 milliseconds) that began at the 
onset of the adjective (e.g., big) and ended 475 milliseconds (the average duration of the 
noun) after the onset of the noun (e.g., pickle). The time window was offset by 200 
milliseconds due to the time needed to program and launch an eye movement (Hallett, 
1986). Average proportions of target fixations across Pragmatic Domain, Felicity, and 
Contrast conditions are shown in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19. Experiment 5a: Average proportions of target fixations during interpretation of 
the scalar adjective and noun (e.g., Click on the small dog) by Domain, Felicity, and 
Contrast conditions. 
 
The proportions of target fixations were first transformed using the empirical logit 
transformation and then analyzed in a multilevel linear regression, using the lme4 
software package in R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). Separate models were 
used for the Prosody and Scalar data. Felicity and Contrast along with their interaction 
were entered as fixed effects (Table 11) with participants and items as random effects. 
All fixed effects were coded with mean-centered contrast codes. When the maximal 
random effects structure justified by the design did not converge or the model was 
overfit, random slopes with the least variance were removed. Model comparison was 
used to assess the significance of effects. 
 In the Scalar Training conditions, there was a main effect of Contrast, such that 
participants made more target fixations in the Contrast condition than the No Contrast 
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condition. There was no significant interaction of Contrast and Felicity. In the Prosody 
Training conditions, there was a marginal main effect of Contrast, such that participants 
made more target fixations in the Contrast condition than the No Contrast condition. A 
marginally significant interaction of Contrast and Felicity was due to a significant 
Contrast effect in the Felicitous Prosody condition (β= -0.11 , SE= 0.04, t= -2.91, p< 
0.01), but no effect of Contrast in the Infelicitous Prosody condition (β= -0.01 , SE= 0.05, 
t= -0.24, p= 0.80). 
Scalar Training 
Fixed Effects 
 β Std. Error t-value p-value 
(Intercept) 0.00 0.07 0.02  
Contrast condition -0.17 0.05 -3.41 1.10e-3 
Felicity condition -0.02 0.06 -0.25 0.80 
Contrast x Felicity -0.01 0.04 -0.25 0.82 
 
Random Effects 
Groups  Variance Std. Dev. Corr. 
Participants (Intercept) 0.07 0.27  
Items (Intercept) 0.06 0.24  
Residual  0.85 0.92  
Observations: 800; Items: 40; Participants: 40 
 
Prosody Training 
Fixed Effects 
 β Std. Error t-value p-value 
(Intercept) 0.00 0.07 -0.01  
Contrast condition -0.09 0.05 -1.78 0.07 
Felicity condition 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.91 
Contrast x Felicity 0.08 0.05 1.60 0.10 
 
Random Effects 
Groups  Variance Std. Dev.  
Items (Intercept) 0.11 0.33  
Participants (Intercept) 0.07 0.27  
Residual  0.82 0.91  
Observations: 800; Items: 40; Participants: 40 
Table 11. Experiment 5a: Results of the linear mixed-effects model of target fixation 
proportions 
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Discussion 
 During the interpretation of scalar adjectives participants made more fixations to 
targets that were in a contrast set, consistent with results from Sedivy et al., (1999). 
However, this contrast-contingent target preference was diminished when participants 
were exposed to a speaker who used prosodic cues to contrast infelicitously. These results 
suggest that listeners are able to adapt their pragmatic inferences as a result of bottom-up 
exposure to infelicitous speech. Surprisingly, adaptation was not observed when the 
listener was previously exposed to a speaker using scalar adjectives infelicitously. This 
lack of adaptation in the Scalars conditions may be due to the fact that the Infelicitous 
training trials consisted only of over-informative instructions. Participants may not 
perceive these instructions as truly infelicitous. The displays contained both big and small 
shapes making the use of size adjectives globally felicitous. Indeed, post-hoc norming of 
the naturalness of instructions paired with their corresponding displays (on a scale of 1 to 
5) revealed that participants rated Infelicitous instructions (M= 4.83) as equally natural 
compared to Felicitous instructions (M= 4.88). 
 
Experiment 5b 
The first aim of Experiment 5b is to replicate the results of 5a with a larger 
sample size. The second aim of 5b is to test whether the adaptation effect is dependent on 
the type of infelicitous cue used to convey a speaker’s unreliability. In Experiment 5a, the 
over-informative scalars were not entirely infelicitous because other size contrasts existed 
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in the displays. In Experiment 5b, infelicity is made more salient by making all the 
shapes in the display the same size. 
Methods 
Participants 
A total of 136 students from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign were 
given partial course credit to participate in the experiment. All participants were fluent 
speakers of American English with normal or corrected-to-normal vision and normal 
hearing.  
Procedure & Materials 
 The procedure and materials were identical to Experiment 5a except for the Scalar 
training trials. In Experiment 5b, the Scalar Training trials were designed such that the 
Infelicitous Scalars training trials were more strongly infelicitous. The scalar adjectives 
were over-informative relative to the entire set of items in the display because all four 
items were the same size (see Figure 20). By contrast, in Experiment 6a, the Infelicitous 
Scalar training trials were only over-informative relative to one pair of items—there were 
always both big and small shapes in the display. In Experiment 5b we make the 
Infelicitous Scalars training more infelicitous in order to have a stronger test of the 
training effect. 
 Prosody training. The prosody training trials were identical to those in 
Experiment 6a. 
 Scalar training.  The auditory stimuli were identical across Felicitous and 
Infelicitous conditions and Reliability was manipulated through the visual display, by 
switching one (or two) of the items. The Felicitous-Scalar training condition was 
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identical to Experiment 6a. In the Infelicitous-Scalar training condition, six of the trials 
included a second instruction with a pre-nominal scalar adjective (e.g., “Point to the small 
circle.”) paired with a display that made the scalar redundant (e.g., a small red circle, a 
small blue triangle, a small yellow triangle, a small blue square). Another three trials 
contained a post-nominal scalar adjective (e.g., “Show me the circle that’s large”) paired 
with a display in which the scalar adjective is redundant (e.g., large red circle, large 
yellow square, large blue triangle, large red square). The last three Scalars-training trials 
contained a scalar adjective (e.g., “Where’s the small square?”) and the display contained 
four shapes the size of which was inconsistent with the scalar adjective used in the audio 
stimulus (e.g., large blue square, large blue triangle, large red circle, and large yellow 
triangle). 
 
“Where’s the yellow triangle? Now, where’s the small square?” 
 
Felicitous-Scalars Infelicitous-Scalars 
Figure 20. Experiment 5b: Example Scalar training conditions. 
 
Results 
As in Experiment 5a, interpretation of the scalar adjective was indexed by the 
proportion of eye-movements that participants made to the target item as they interpreted 
the critical instructions, which consisted of a scalar adjective and a noun (e.g., Click on 
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the small dog). A fixation was coded as a target-fixation if the x,y fixation-coordinates 
landed on the target object (e.g., the small dog), or on a small portion of the white space 
surrounding it (this buffer space did not overlap with any other object). Target fixations 
were measured in a time window (average duration 726 milliseconds) that began at the 
onset of the adjective (e.g., big) and ended 475 milliseconds (the average duration of the 
noun) after the onset of the noun (e.g., pickle). The time window was offset by 200 
milliseconds due to the time needed to program and launch an eye movement (Hallett, 
1986). Average proportions of target fixations across Pragmatic Domain, Felicity, and 
Contrast conditions are shown in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21. Experiment 5b: Average proportions of target fixations during interpretation of 
the scalar adjective and noun (e.g., Click on the small dog) by Pragmatic Domain, 
Felicity, and Contrast conditions. 
 
The proportions of target fixations were first transformed using the empirical logit 
transformation and then analyzed in a multilevel linear regression, using the lme4 
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software package in R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). Separate models were 
used for the Prosody and Scalar data. Felicity and Contrast along with their interaction 
were entered as fixed effects (Table 12) with subjects and trials as random effects. All 
fixed effects were coded with mean-centered contrast codes. When the maximal random 
effects structure justified by the design did not converge or the model was overfit, 
random slopes with the least variance were removed. Model comparison was used to 
assess the significance of effects. 
 In the Scalar Training conditions, there was a main effect of Contrast, such that 
participants made more target fixations in the Contrast condition than the No Contrast 
condition. In the Prosody Training conditions, there was a main effect of Contrast, such 
that participants made more target fixations in the Contrast condition than the No 
Contrast condition. There was no significant interaction of Contrast and Felicity in either 
the Prosody Training or Scalar Training conditions. 
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Scalar Training 
Fixed Effects 
 β Std. Error t-value p-value 
(Intercept) 0.00 0.06 0.00  
Contrast condition -0.11 0.04 -2.84 5.48e-3 
Felicity condition 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.97 
Contrast x Felicity -0.03 0.03 -0.84 0.40 
 
Random Effects 
Groups  Variance Std. Dev.  
Participants (Intercept) 0.17 0.41  
Items (Intercept) 0.04 0.19  
Residual  0.79 0.89  
Observations: 1360; Items: 40; Participants: 68 
 
Prosody Training 
Fixed Effects 
 β Std. Error t-value p-value 
(Intercept) 0.00 0.06 0.00  
Contrast condition -0.14 0.04 -3.25 1.62e-3 
Felicity condition -0.06 0.06 -1.03 0.29 
Contrast x Felicity 0.01 0.04 0.31 0.73 
 
Random Effects 
Groups  Variance Std. Dev.  
Participants (Intercept) 0.15 0.38  
Items (Intercept) 0.05 0.23  
Residual  0.79 0.89  
Observations: 1360; Items: 40; Participants: 68 
Table 12. Experiment 5b: Results of the linear mixed-effects model of target fixation 
proportions 
 
Discussion 
 As in Experiment 5a, during the interpretation of scalar adjectives participants 
made more fixations to targets that were in a contrast set, replicating Sedivy et al., 
(1999). Unlike in Experiment 5a, this contrast-contingent target preference was not 
diminished when participants were exposed to a speaker who used prosodic or scalar cues 
to contrast infelicitously. These results suggest that the effects observed in the previous 
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experiment may have been spurious and listeners are not, in fact, able to adapt their 
pragmatic inferences as a result of bottom-up exposure to infelicitous speech.  
 Alternatively, the experimental design used in 5a and 5b may not have provided 
suitable circumstances to observe adaptation. First, it may be that participants adapted 
their pragmatic inferences during the training phase but once they began the test phase, 
because the context change was too abrupt, they didn’t transfer that prior learning. 
Participants were explicitly told that the speaker was the same. However, the training and 
test phases differed in two important ways: (i) the training phase consisted of trials with 
colored geometric shapes while the test phase consisted of trials with more complex 
images, (ii) participants’ eye-movements were monitored during the test phase but not the 
training phase (and as a result, a calibration occurred in between the two phases).  
Second, the amount of evidence that the speaker was infelicitous may have been 
insufficient to elicit adaptation. Across the entire experimental session, the proportion of 
infelicitous uses of a pragmatic cue was only 36% in the Infelicitous conditions14. 
Perhaps the large number of felicitous trials (including 30 felicitous fillers) at test 
counteracted any adaptation that resulted from the training phase. 
The goal of Experiment 6 is to provide a more suitable environment for learning 
about the speaker’s pragmatic competence during training and applying that learning 
during test. To achieve this, the contexts during training and test were made more similar 
in multiple ways: (i) training, test, and filler trials were randomly intermixed, (ii) eye-
tracking occurred during all trials and the calibration was done at the very beginning of 
the experimental session, (iii) the types of images used in training and test were the same. 																																																								
14 The training phase consisted of 12 infelicitous trials and the test phase contained 10 infelicitous trials 
(No Contrast trials), for a total of 22 infelicitous trials out of a grand total of 62 trials across training and 
test (22/62= 0.355). 
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Additionally, in the Infelicitous condition in Experiment 6, infelicitous sentences 
constitute the vast majority (93%) of what the participant is exposed to.   
One goal of Experiments 5a and 5b was to compare cross-domain pragmatic 
adaptation to within-domain pragmatic adaptation. However, because we failed to obtain 
reliable evidence of either cross-domain or within-domain pragmatic adaptation, we 
focus now on eliciting adaptation within the domain of scalar adjectives and set aside the 
question of transfer across pragmatic domains. 
 
Experiment 6  
The aim of Experiment 6 is to test whether participants can adapt their scalar 
inferences to the pragmatic reliability of the speaker. I examine eye fixations during the 
interpretation of size adjectives in participants who have been exposed either to a speaker 
who uses modifiers felicitously or a speaker who uses them infelicitously. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-four undergraduate students at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign participated in this experiment in exchange for partial course credit. 
Participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and spoke English fluently. 
Procedure  
 Participants listened to instructions such as “Click on the big dog” and viewed 4-
picture displays on a desktop computer while their eye-movements were monitored using 
an Eyelink-1000 desktop-mounted eye-tracker at 1000hz. They were instructed to click 
  92 
on the item that best matched what the speaker said and, if they weren’t sure, to just use 
their best guess (some of the instructions were globally ambiguous). Stimulus 
presentation was controlled using Matlab’s Psychophysics Toolbox 3 (PTB-3, Brainard, 
1997). The entire experiment lasted about 30 minutes. 
Materials 
 Each participant saw 40 test trials (Figure 22), 80 training trials (Figure 23), and 
180 fillers, for a total of 300 trials. The order of trials was randomized for each subject 
with the constraint that the first three trials were filler trials. Participants were randomly 
assigned to the Felicitous or Infelicitous condition.  Test trials were identical across 
Felicitous and Infelicitous conditions. Twenty of the test trials were Contrast trials 
(Figure 22a.). The instruction about which object to select always contained a scalar 
adjective (e.g., “Click on the big pickle”). The display contained a target item (e.g., a big 
pickle), an item that was in a size contrast pair with the target (e.g., a small pickle), a 
large distractor item (e.g., a big stapler) and a small distractor item (e.g., a small tennis 
ball). The other 20 test trials were No Contrast trials (Figure 22b.). The instruction also 
always contained a scalar adjective (e.g., “Click on the big pickle”), however in the No 
Contrast trials the adjective was infelicitous.  The display contained a target item (e.g., a 
big pickle), a distractor item that was in a size contrast with the target (e.g., a small 
hammer), a large distractor item (e.g., a big stapler) and a small distractor item (e.g., a 
small tennis ball).  
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a. Contrast b. No Contrast 
Figure 22. Experiment 6: Example test trials in the Contrast and No Contrast conditions. 
Corresponding audio instruction for both conditions: “Click on the big pickle.” 
 
 Training trials differed by Reliability condition. Forty of the training trials were 
Contrast trials. The instruction about which object to select always contained a scalar 
adjective (e.g., “Click on the big briefcase”). In the Felicitous condition, the adjective 
“big” was justified:  the Contrast displays (Figure 23a) contained a target item (e.g., a big 
briefcase), an item that was in a size contrast pair with the target (e.g., a small briefcase), 
a large distractor item (e.g., a big lizard) and a small distractor item (e.g., a small car 
seat). In the Infelicitous condition, the adjective “big” was not justified: the Contrast 
displays (Figure 23c) contained a target item (e.g., a big briefcase), a distractor item that 
was NOT in a size contrast with the target (e.g., a small calculator), a large distractor item 
(e.g., a big lizard) and a small distractor item (e.g., a small car seat). The other 40 training 
trials, were No Contrast trials. On these no-contrast trials, the instruction about which 
object to select never contained a scalar adjective (e.g., “Click on the briefcase”). In the 
Felicitous condition, the lack of an adjective was justified: the No Contrast displays 
(Figure 23b) contained a target item (e.g., a big briefcase), a distractor item that was NOT 
in a size contrast with the target (e.g., a small calculator), a large distractor item (e.g., a 
big lizard) and a small distractor item (e.g., a small car seat). In the Infelicitous condition, 
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the lack of an adjective was not justified: the No Contrast displays (Figure 23d) contained 
a target item (e.g., a big briefcase), an item that was in a size contrast pair with the target 
(e.g., a small briefcase), a large distractor item (e.g., a big lizard) and a small distractor 
item (e.g., a small car seat). Thus, for participants in the Infelicitous condition, Contrast 
training trials were infelicitous because they contained a contrastive adjective in the 
absence of a size contrasting pair of items and No Contrast training trials were 
infelicitous because no size adjective was used when it was necessary in order to 
disambiguate between two differently-sized but otherwise identical items. 
Felicitous Training condition  
 
“Click on the big briefcase.” 
a. Contrast condition 
“Click on the briefcase.” 
b. No Contrast condition 
 
Infelicitous Training condition  
 
“Click on the big briefcase.” 
c. Contrast condition 
“Click on the briefcase.” 
d. No Contrast condition 
Figure 23. Experiment 6: Example training trials across Reliability and Contrast v. No 
Contrast conditions. 
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 Filler trials also differed by Reliability condition. Sixty filler trials were Contrast 
Control trials in which the instructions did not contain a scalar adjective (e.g., “Click on 
the cake.”) and two of the distractors were in a size contrast pair.  In the Felicitous 
condition, the displays contained a target item (e.g., a big cake), a distractor item (e.g., a 
small toothbrush), and a pair of size-contrasted distractor items (e.g., a big burger and a 
small burger). In the Infelicitous condition, the single distractor item was replaced by a 
contrast for the target (e.g., a small cake), rendering the instruction globally ambiguous 
(e.g., “Click on the cake” when there are two cakes in the scene). A pair of size-
contrasted distractor items (e.g., a big burger and a small burger) was also present in the 
display. Another sixty filler trials were Other Contrast trials. The audio instructions 
contained a non-scalar contrastive adjective, such as, “Click on the glazed doughnut.” In 
the Felicitous condition, the display contained a target item (e.g., a glazed doughnut), a 
contrasting item of the same category as the target (e.g., a powdered doughnut), and two 
distractors (e.g., a big muffin pan and a small saddle). In the Infelicitous condition, the 
display contained a target item (e.g., a glazed doughnut), but no contrasting item. There 
were three distractors (e.g., a medium rug, a big muffin pan, and a small saddle). The last 
sixty filler trials were Other Contrast Control trials. The audio instructions did not contain 
an adjective (e.g., “Click on the couch”). In the Felicitous condition, the display 
contained a target item (e.g., a small couch), a distractor item (e.g., a big cheese plate), 
and a pair of items from the same category (e.g., a glazed doughnut and a powdered 
doughnut). In the Infelicitous condition, the display contained a target item (e.g., a small 
couch), a size-contrasted item (e.g., a big couch), and a pair of items from the same 
category (e.g., a glazed doughnut and a powdered doughnut). 
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 Two counterbalancing lists were created to allow target items (e.g., big pickle) to 
appear both in the Contrast and No Contrast conditions across subjects. Target items were 
never repeated for a given subject, but they could reappear as distractor items. 
Participants were randomly assigned to a single counterbalancing list. 
Results  
Interpretation of the scalar adjective was indexed by the proportion of eye-
movements that participants made to the target item as they interpreted the critical 
instructions, which consisted of a scalar adjective and a noun (e.g., Click on the big 
pickle). A fixation was coded as a target-fixation if the x,y fixation-coordinates landed on 
the target object (e.g., the big pickle), or on a small portion of the white space 
surrounding it (this buffer space did not overlap with any other object). Target fixations 
were measured in a time window (average duration 1197 milliseconds) that began at the 
onset of the adjective (e.g., big) and ended 564 milliseconds (the average duration of the 
noun) after the onset of the noun (e.g., pickle). The time window was offset by 200 
milliseconds due to the time needed to program and launch an eye movement (Hallett, 
1986). Average proportions of target fixations across Felicity (Felicitous vs. Infelicitous) 
and Contrast (Contrast vs. No Contrast) conditions are shown in Figure 24. 
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Figure 24. Average proportions of target fixations during interpretation of the scalar 
adjective and noun (e.g., Click on the big pickle) by Felicity and Contrast conditions. 
 
The proportions of target fixations were first transformed using the empirical logit 
transformation and then analyzed in a multilevel linear regression, using the lme4 
software package in R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). Felicity and Contrast 
along with their interaction were entered as fixed effects (Table 13) with subjects and 
trials as random effects. All fixed effects were coded with mean-centered contrast codes. 
When the maximal random effects structure justified by the design did not converge or 
the model was overfit, random slopes with the least variance were removed. Model 
comparison was used to assess the significance of effects. 
 There was a main effect of Contrast, such that participants made more target 
fixations in the Contrast condition than the No Contrast condition. A significant 
interaction of Contrast and Felicity was due to a large Contrast effect in the Felicitous 
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Speaker condition (β= -0.20 , SE= 0.03, t= -6.62, p< 5e-08), and a reduced effect of 
Contrast in the Infelicitous Speaker condition (β= -0.09 , SE= 0.04, t= -2.49, p< 0.05).  
Fixed Effects     
 β Std. Error t-value p-value 
(Intercept) 8.04e-16 3.62e-02 0  
Contrast condition 1.48e-01 2.44e-02 6.04 2.66e-08 
Felicity condition -5.48e-02 3.62e-02 -1.51 0.13 
Contrast x Felicity -5.38e-02 2.44e-02 -2.20 0.03 
     
Random Effects     
Groups  Variance Std. Dev.  
Items (Intercept) 0.02 0.14  
Participants (Intercept) 0.05 0.21  
Residual  0.91 0.95  
Observations: 2520; Items: 80; Participants: 63  
Table 13. Experiment 5: Results of the linear mixed-effects model of target fixation 
proportions 
 
Discussion 
 During the interpretation of scalar adjectives participants made more fixations to 
targets that were in a contrast set, consistent with results from Sedivy et al., (1999). 
However, this contrast-contingent target preference was diminished when participants 
were exposed to a speaker who used adjectives infelicitously. These results suggest that 
listeners are able to adapt their pragmatic inferences as a result of bottom-up exposure to 
infelicitous speech. However, the Contrast effect is still present in the Infelicitous 
condition, despite overwhelming evidence that pragmatic cues are being used 
infelicitously (93% infelicitous sentences). This resistance to adaptation suggests that 
listeners have a strong expectation that speakers are Gricean. A large amount of evidence, 
either in the form of a top-down characterization (as in Grodner & Sedivy, 2011) or in the 
form of overwhelming bottom-up cues (as in Experiment 6), is necessary to adjust those 
expectations and alter the inferential process.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
Efficient language comprehension relies on the listener’s ability to integrate 
information from multiple sources as they process the language in real time. The goal of 
the present research was to explore how the visuo-spatial context and learning context 
play a role in tailoring which inferences are made during the on-line interpretation of a 
sentence. 
In Chapter 2, listeners made use of the visual context (i.e., whether there were 
contrasts in the scene) in combination with perspective information (i.e., whether both 
items in a contrast set were visible to the speaker) when interpreting referring expressions 
such as the big apple. Surprisingly, the ability to do this was not linked to working 
memory or memory cue retrieval measures. Experiment 2 explored whether such a 
relationship was masked by the listeners’ dynamic adaptation to speakers’ referential 
choices. However, there was no evidence that listeners were adapting their on-line use of 
perspective-taking to the perspective-taking performance of their partner. 
In Chapter 3, listeners encoded spatial perspectives in a partner-specific manner 
and accessed those partner-specific representations on-line in the service of efficient 
interpretation of spatial language such as Move it right…. The results presented here 
provide support for a model of language comprehension in which the speaker’s identity 
provides a contextual constraint on the set of possible memory representations that can be 
brought to be bear on the interpretation of an utterance (Brown-Schmidt, Yoon, & 
Ryskin, 2015).  
In Chapter 4, I found evidence that listeners can learn that a given speaker is 
pragmatically infelicitous and adjust their contrastive inferences as a result. However, 
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this adaptation requires overwhelming evidence that the speaker is infelicitous and the 
contrastive inferences—that are no longer appropriate when the speaker is infelicitous—
are never fully cancelled. These results make contact with recently proposed accounts of 
language processing that argue for the ubiquitous role of adaptation within a Bayesian 
belief updating framework (Kleinschmidt & Jaeger, 2015). One potential explanation for 
the resistance to adaptation observed in our experiments is that listeners have very strong 
prior beliefs about how speakers typically use contrastive adjectives—indeed, in 
spontaneous production situations, speakers seem to be consistently felicitous when using 
size adjectives (e.g., Brown-Schmidt & Konopka, 2011)—and thus much new evidence is 
needed to significantly change the listeners’ beliefs. 
Across the experiments reported in this dissertation, listeners make use of varied 
visuospatial information (e.g., spatial orientation, relative size, occlusion) and draw 
inferences about the speaker’s intentions during on-line comprehension, allowing for 
efficient sentence interpretation. In addition, I provide evidence that listeners attend to 
and learn high-level characteristics of their interlocutors, e.g., spatial perspective 
(Experiments 3 and 4) and pragmatic competence (Experiment 6), from exposure to 
bottom-up cues. However, this learning may require large amounts of exposure to 
override the expectations that listeners bring to any language task (see Experiments 2, 5a, 
5b). These results point to a language processing system that balances adaptation and 
generalization in an effort to account for speaker-specific features as well as language-
wide tendencies. 
The results of this work contribute to our understanding of the ways in which 
listeners use multiple sources of information to constrain their interpretation of an 
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utterance. Furthermore, they shed light on the learning and memory mechanisms that 
allow listeners to comprehend language efficiently in the face of massive ambiguity.  
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APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES 
Cue Characteristic Correct Cues Incorrect Cues Welch t-test 
Cue to target associative 
strength 
M = 0.08,  
SD = 0.05 
M = 0.02,  
SD = 0.02 
t(183.7) = 14.42,  
p  <2e-16 
Cue in database M = 0.47,  
SD = 0.17 
M = 0.58,  
SD = 0.17 
t(299.9) = -5.58,  
p = 5.5e-8 
Number of associates from 
cue 
M = 6.11,  
SD = 2.23 
M = 8.18,  
SD = 2.60 
t(293.3) = -7.42,  
p = 1.3e-12 
Total associative strength 
from cue 
M = 0.38,  
SD = 0.14 
M = 0.46,  
SD = 0.14 
t(300) = -5.24,  
p = 3.05e-7 
Table 14. Analysis of cue characteristics by success of the cue. For more details about 
these measures, see Tullis and Benjamin (2015b). 
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 Mean (SD) Reliability 
Stroop One proportion correct: 0.85 (0.08) α = 0.81, 95% CI = [0.76, 0.86] 
Stroop Two interference in ms: 90.7 (143.8) α = 0.8, 95% CI = [0.75, 0.85] 
Minus Two Span score out of 12: 10.26 (1.12) ρ*= 0.80 
Operation Span score out of 15: 11.13 (2.90) α = 0.87, 95% CI = [.74, 1] 
Cued Recall number correct out of 40: 
17.62 (8.47) 
α = 0.88, 95% CI = [0.85, 0.92] 
CFQ sum of responses (maximum 100):  
43.51 (11.60) 
α = 0.85, 95% CI = [0.81, 0.89] 
Table 15. Means, standard deviations and reliabilities for six measures of individual 
differences. Minus Two Span can only be split in one way so the Spearman-Brown 
prediction formula is used to measure reliability rather than coefficient alpha. 
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 Stroop 
One 
Stroop 
Two 
Minus 
Two Span 
Operation 
Span 
Cued 
Recall 
CFQ 
Stroop One  -           
Stroop Two 0.09 -          
Minus Two Span 0.04 0.13 -        
Operation Span 0.25 0.11 0.36 -      
Cued Recall 0.26 0.02 0.25 0.37 -    
CFQ 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.21  - 
Table 16. Correlation matrix for all individual difference measures, corrected for 
attenuation. All scores were centered and standardized. The Stroop One scores were first 
logit-transformed because they were proportions.  
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 Estimate Std. Error z-value p-value 
(Intercept) 1.30 0.06 20.94 <2e-16 
Partner’s production accuracy on previous 
trial 0.03 0.18 0.15 0.88 
Actor’s production accuracy on previous trial 0.04 0.19 0.22 0.83 
Operation Span 0.03 0.07 0.50 0.62 
Minus Two Span -0.10 0.07 -1.50 0.13 
Stroop 2 0.06 0.06 0.97 0.33 
Stroop 1 0.09 0.06 1.41 0.16 
Partner’s production accuracy on previous 
trial x Actor’s production accuracy on 
previous trial 0.43 0.60 0.72 0.47 
Partner’s production accuracy on previous 
trial x Operation Span 0.00 0.19 0.01 0.99 
Actor’s production accuracy on previous trial 
x Operation Span 0.42 0.19 2.21 0.03 † 
Partner’s production accuracy on previous 
trial x Minus Two Span 0.15 0.20 0.73 0.47 
Actor’s production accuracy on previous trial 
x Minus Two Span -0.44 0.22 -1.97 0.05  
Partner’s production accuracy on previous 
trial x Stroop 2 0.02 0.18 0.09 0.93 
Actor’s production accuracy on previous trial 
x Stroop 2 -0.09 0.18 -0.48 0.63 
Partner’s production accuracy on previous 
trial x Stroop 1 -0.09 0.18 -0.51 0.61 
Actor’s production accuracy on previous trial 
x Stroop 1 0.24 0.20 1.19 0.23 
Partner’s production accuracy on previous 
trial x Actor’s production accuracy on 
previous trial x Operation Span -0.04 0.54 -0.08 0.93 
Partner’s production accuracy on previous 
trial x Actor’s production accuracy on 
previous trial x Minus Two Span 1.14 0.72 1.59 0.11 
Partner’s production accuracy on previous 
trial x Actor’s production accuracy on 
previous trial x Stroop 2 0.76 0.54 1.40 0.16 
Partner’s production accuracy on previous 
trial x Actor’s production accuracy on 
previous trial x Stroop 1 -0.11 0.66 -0.17 0.86 
Table 17. Experiment 2: Multiple regression analysis  
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 Estimate Std. Error z-value p-value 
(Intercept) 1.28 0.06 20.98 <2e-16 
Partner’s production accuracy on previous 
trial 0.07 0.17 0.40 0.69 
Quarters -0.04 0.06 -0.70 0.49 
Stroop 1 0.09 0.06 1.47 0.14 
Stroop 2  0.08 0.06 1.24 0.22 
Operation Span 0.04 0.07 0.60 0.55 
Minus Two Span -0.09 0.07 -1.39 0.16 
Partner’s production accuracy on previous 
trial x Quarters -0.30 0.17 -1.78 0.07  
Partner’s production accuracy on previous 
trial x Stroop 1 -0.05 0.17 -0.30 0.76 
Quarters  x Stroop 1 -0.07 0.06 -1.19 0.23 
Partner’s production accuracy on previous 
trial x Stroop 2 0.05 0.18 0.30 0.77 
Quarters x Stroop 2 0.00 0.06 -0.07 0.95 
Partner’s production accuracy on previous 
trial x Operation Span -0.03 0.19 -0.18 0.86 
Quarters x oSpan.c -0.01 0.06 -0.13 0.89 
Partner’s production accuracy on previous 
trial x Minus Two Span 0.12 0.19 0.62 0.54 
Quarters x Minus Two Span -0.10 0.07 -1.50 0.13 
Partner’s production accuracy on previous 
trial x Quarters x Stroop 1 0.17 0.17 1.03 0.30 
Partner’s production accuracy on previous 
trial x Quarters x Stroop 2 -0.39 0.19 -2.09 0.04 † 
Partner’s production accuracy on previous 
trial x Quarters x Operation Span -0.16 0.18 -0.87 0.39 
Partner’s production accuracy on previous 
trial x Quarters x Minus Two Span 0.02 0.18 0.09 0.93 
Table 18. Experiment 2: Multiple regression analysis 
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Table 19. Experiment 3 Design 
  
List Array Block 1 Block 2 
  
Number 
of 
speakers 
Female 
voice 
Angle 
Pair 
Number of 
speakers 
Female 
voice 
Angle 
Pair 
1 v1 1T A top 2T B bottom 
2 v1 1T A bottom 2T B top 
3 v1 1T B top 2T A bottom 
4 v1 1T B bottom 2T A top 
5 v1 2T A top 1T B bottom 
6 v1 2T A bottom 1T B top 
7 v1 2T B top 1T A bottom 
8 v1 2T B bottom 1T A top 
9 v2 1T A top 2T B bottom 
10 v2 1T A bottom 2T B top 
11 v2 1T B top 2T A bottom 
12 v2 1T B bottom 2T A top 
13 v2 2T A top 1T B bottom 
14 v2 2T A bottom 1T B top 
15 v2 2T B top 1T A bottom 
16 v2 2T B bottom 1T A top 
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List Array Block 1 Block 2 
  
Number 
of 
speakers 
Female 
Voice 
Angle 
pair 
Number 
of 
speakers 
Female  
Voice 
Angle 
pair 
1 v1 1T A top 2T B top 
2 v1 1T B top 2T A top 
3 v1 2T A top 1T B top 
4 v1 2T B top 1T A top 
5 v2 1T A top 2T B top 
6 v2 1T B top 2T A top 
7 v2 2T A top 1T B top 
8 v2 2T B top 1T A top 
Table 20. Experiment 4 Design 
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Random Effects  Variance 
   
First Time Window   
Participants  (Intercept) 1.294 
 Speaker 0.445 
 Angle pair 0.638 
 Speaker x Angle pair 0.662 
Items  (Intercept) 0.180 
 Angle pair 0.198 
   
Second Time Window   
Participants  (Intercept) 0.999 
 Speaker 0.768 
 Speaker x Angle pair 3.186 
 Speaker x Angle pair x Switching 0.664 
Items  (Intercept) 0.114 
   
Third Time Window   
Participants  (Intercept) 0.638 
Items  (Intercept) 0.100 
Table 21. Experiment 3: Random effects for generalized linear model analyses in three 
time windows. Maximal random effects structure justified by the design was used in all 
models. When the maximal model did not converge, the random component with the 
least variance was removed and the model was refit.
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Random Effects  Variance 
   
First Time Window   
Participants  (Intercept) 1.883 
 Speaker 1.293 
 Switching 0.042 
 Speaker x Switching 0.007 
Items  (Intercept) 0.214 
 Speaker 0.031 
   
Second Time Window   
Participants  (Intercept) 1.791 
 Speaker 0.888 
 Switching 0.055 
 Speaker x Switching 0.174 
Items  (Intercept) 0.183 
 Speaker 0.064 
   
Third Time Window   
Participants  (Intercept) 1.287 
 Speaker 0.426 
 Switching 0.009 
 Speaker x Switching 0.063 
Items  (Intercept) 0.125 
 Speaker 3.1e-5 
 
Table 22. Experiment 4: Random effects for generalized linear model analyses in three 
time windows. Maximal random effects structure justified by the design was used in all 
models.
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Figure 25. Experiment 3: Timecourse of proportions of fixations before the onset of the direction term (e.g., Move the circle with the 
green crosses to the…). “Other shapes” includes the sum of fixations to 21 cells containing shapes.  
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Figure 26. Experiment 3: Timecourse of proportions of fixations after the onset of the direction term. Gray dashed lines indicate the 
approximate onset of the shape word (e.g., circle) and the pattern word (e.g., dots) in sentences like Move the circle with the green 
crosses to the right onto the circle with the purple dots. “Other shapes” includes the sum of fixations to 21 cells containing shapes. 
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Figure 27. Experiment 4: Timecourse of proportions of fixations before the onset of the direction term (e.g., Move the circle with the 
green crosses to the…). “Other shapes” includes the sum of fixations to 21 cells containing shapes.  
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Figure 28. Experiment 4: Timecourse of proportions of fixations after the onset of the direction term. Gray dashed lines indicate the 
approximate onset of the shape word (e.g., circle) and the pattern word (e.g., dots) in sentences like Move the circle with the green 
crosses to the right onto the circle with the purple dots. “Other shapes” includes the sum of fixations to 21 cells containing shapes. 
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Figure 29. Experiment 3: First fixations after hearing the direction term and fixating the to-be-dragged item. Counts are summed 
across all trials. Black lines indicate average count of fixations for one of the 20 “other” unrelated shapes. 
bottom top
0
250
500
750
1000
1250
arrow corner
opposite
to arrow
competitor
by design
egocentric
competitor
other
perspective
in block
target 20 other
shapes
arrow corner
opposite
to arrow
competitor
by design
egocentric
competitor
other
perspective
in block
target 20 other
shapes
location of fixation
co
un
t o
f f
ixa
tio
ns
speaker(s)
1
2
  132 
 
Figure 30. Experiment 4: First fixations after hearing the direction term and fixating the to-be-dragged item. Counts are summed 
across all trials. Black lines indicate average count of fixations for one of the 20 “other” unrelated shapes. 
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